

~~SECRET~~

MAIL DRAFTING
DEPARTMENT

25

1/16

B.F.
H.W.

April 24, 1945.

D.C. 22 45
4-22

Dear Mr. President:

I think it is very important that I should have a talk with you as soon as possible on a highly secret matter.

I mentioned it to you shortly after you took office but have not urged it since on account of the pressure you have been under. It, however, has such a bearing on our present foreign relations and has such an important effect upon all my thinking in this field that I think you ought to know about it without much further delay.

AD 26

Faithfully yours,

Henry A. Wallace

Secretary of War AD 26



The President,
The White House.

APR 25

Put on list
tomorrow. H.A.W.

DECLASSIFIED
1. G. 2000 10 1994 000 000 000
2. G. 2000 10 1994 000 000 000
3. G. 2000 10 1994 000 000 000

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE LIBRARY
White House Central File
Confidential

[July 16, 1943]

At 3:30 P.M. we saw Byers.
Adm (55th) Leahy and Dill
in an open car for Berlin,
followed by my two aides
and service and security se-
cret service and military
guards and preceded by a
two star general in a closed
car with a couple of plain
clothes men to fool em if
they started off to any target
practice of consequence on the
Pres. They didn't.

We received the Second
Armored Division and
had a invitation on the gunboat
of Co E 17th Armored Eng Co.
Gen Collier who seemed to

Know his staff, put up in a recognizable car built with side seats and no top just like a Lada van minus the top on a five truck with seats only so low and we drove slowly down a mile and a half of good roads and some million of dollars worth of equipment which had already paid its way to Berlin.

Then we went on to Berlin and saw absolute ruin. Hitler's folly. He overreached himself by trying to take in too much territory. He had no morale, and his people backed him up. Never did

I see a very sorrowful sight, nor in trees retribution to the nth degree.

The most sorrowful part of the situation is the divided Hungarian people. Of course the Russians have kidnapped the able bodied and I suppose have made no voluntary work men of them. They have also forced Hitler's horses left standing and have sent the best to Russia. But Hitler did the same thing to them.

It is the Golden Rule in reverse - and it is not a uplifting sight. What a pity that the human animal is not able to put his moral thinking into practice!

212-729

We saw old men, old women,
young women, children from
4 to 16 years carrying packs
pushing carts, pulling carts,
widely ejected by the com-
munist and enjoying what
they could of their belongings
to sing when in part. alone.

I thought of Carthage & Baalbek
Jerusalem, Rome, Atlanta,
Peking, Babylon, Nineveh,-
Scipio, Hannibal II, Titus,
Hannibal, Sherman, Jesup's
Khan, Alexander, Darius
the Great - but Hitler only
destroyed Stalingrad - and
Berlin: I hope for some

sort of peace is but a
fece that machines are
cleed of morsls by some
centurts; and then morsls
catch up perhp, there'll
no reason for any of it.

I hope not. But we are
only termites on a planet
and maybe when we bore
too deeply into the planet,
there'll a reckoning - the
knows?



PSF- 522 Chas. Rose

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

16 July 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

SUBJECT: The Test.

1. This is not a concise, formal military report but an attempt to relate what I would have told you if you had been here on my return from New Mexico.

2. At 0530, 16 July 1945, in a remote section of the Alamogordo Air Base, New Mexico, the first full scale test was made of the implosion type atomic fission bomb. For the first time in history there was a nuclear explosion.

And what an explosion!



The bomb was not dropped from an airplane but was exploded on a platform on top of a 100-foot high steel tower.

3. The test was successful beyond the most optimistic expectations of anyone. Based on the data which it has been possible to work up to date, I estimate the energy generated to be in excess of the equivalent of 15,000 to 20,000 tons of TNT; and this is a conservative estimate. Data based on measurements which we have not yet been able to reconcile would make the energy release several times the conservative figure. There were tremendous blast effects.



HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY
Papers of Harry S. Truman
LANSING LIBRARY

Memorandum for Secretary of War

15 July 1945

For a brief period there was a lighting effect within a radius of 20 miles equal to several suns in midday; a huge ball of fire was formed which lasted for several seconds. This ball mushroomed and rose to a height of over ten thousand feet before it dimmed. The light from the explosion was seen clearly at Albuquerque, Santa Fe, Silver City, El Paso and other points generally to about 180 miles away. The sound was heard to the same distance in a few instances but generally to about 100 miles. Only a few windows were broken although one was some 125 miles away. A massive cloud was formed which surged and billowed upward with tremendous power, reaching the stratosphere at an elevation of 41,000 feet, 36,000 feet above the ground, in about five minutes, breaking without interruption through a temperature inversion at 17,000 feet which most of the scientists thought would stop it. Two supplementary explosions occurred in the cloud shortly after the main explosion. The cloud contained several thousand tons of dust picked up from the ground and a considerable amount of iron in the gaseous form. Our present thought is that this iron ignited when it mixed with the oxygen in the air to cause these supplementary explosions. Huge concentrations of highly radioactive materials resulted from the fission and were contained in this cloud.

4. A crater from which all vegetation had vanished, with a diameter of 1200 feet and a slight slope toward the center, was formed. In the center was a shallow bowl 130 feet in diameter and 6 feet in depth. The material within the crater was deeply pulverized dirt. The material within the outer circle is greenish and can be distinctly seen from as much as 5 miles away. The steel from the tower was vaporized. 1500 feet away there was a four-inch iron pipe 16 feet high set in concrete and strongly gaged. It disappeared completely.

JOHN R. DODD
Captain of
Engineering Detachment

Memorandum for Secretary of War

18 July 1945

5. One-half mile from the explosion there was a massive steel test cylinder weighing 220 tons. The base of the cylinder was solidly encased in concrete. Surrounding the cylinder was a strong steel tower 70 feet high, firmly anchored to concrete foundations. This tower is comparable to a steel building bay that would be found in typical 15 or 20 story skyscraper or in warehouse construction. Forty tons of steel were used to fabricate the laser which was 70 feet high, the height of a six story building. The cross bracing was much stronger than that normally used in ordinary steel construction. The absence of the solid walls of a building gave the blast a much less effective surface to push against. The blast tore the tower from its foundations, twisted it, ripped it apart and left it flat on the ground. The effects on the tower indicate that, at that distance, unshielded permanent steel and masonry buildings would have been destroyed. I no longer consider the Peatoge a safe shelter from such a bomb. Enclosed are a sketch showing the tower before the explosion and a telephotograph showing what it looked like afterwards. None of us had expected it to be damaged.

6. The cloud traveled to a great height first in the form of a ball, then mushroomed, then changed into a long trailing chimney-shaped column and finally was sent in several directions by the variable winds at the different elevations. It deposited its dust and radioactive materials over a wide area. It was followed and monitored by medical doctors and scientists with instruments to check its radioactive effects. While here and there the activity on the ground was fairly high, at no place did it reach a concentration which required evacuation of the population. Radio-

18 July 1945

activities material in small quantities was counted as much as 120 miles away. The measurements are being continued in order to have adequate data with which to protect the Government's interests in case of future claims. For a few hours I was more than uncomfortable about the situation.

7. For distances as great as 300 miles away, observers were stationed to check on blast effects, property damage, destructibility and reactions of the population. While complete reports have not yet been received, I see above that no persons were injured nor was there any real property damage outside our Government area. As soon as all the voluminous data can be checked and correlated, full technical studies will be possible.

WERNER
July 17

8. Our long range weather predictions had indicated that we could expect another favorable, for our tests beginning on the morning of the 17th and continuing for four days. This was almost a certainty if we were to believe our long range forecasters. The prediction for the morning of the 16th was not so certain but there was about an 80% chance of the conditions being suitable. During the night there were thunderstorms with lightning flashes all over the area. The test had been originally set for 0400 hours and all the night through, because of the bad weather, there were urgings from many of the scientists to postpone the test. Such a delay might well have had crippling results due to mechanical difficulties in our complicated test set-up. Fortunately, we disregarded the urgings. We held fire and waited the night through hoping for suitable weather. We had to delay an hour and a half, to 0530, before we could fire. This was 30 minutes before sunrise.


18 July 1945

9. Because of bad weather, our two B-29 observation airplanes were unable to take off as scheduled from Kirtland Field at Albuquerque and when they finally did get off, they found it impossible to get over the target because of the heavy clouds and the thunder storms. Certain desired observations could not be made and while the people in the airplanes saw the explosion from a distance, they were not as close as they will be in action. We still have no reason to anticipate the loss of our plane in an actual operation although we cannot guarantee safety.

10. Just before 1100 the news stories from all over the state started to flow into the Albuquerque Associated Press. I then directed the issuance by the Commanding Officer, Alamogordo Air Base of a news release as shown on the enclosure. With the assistance of the Office of Censorship we were able to limit the news stories to the approved releases supplemented in the local papers by brief stories from the many eyewitnesses not connected with our project. One of these was a blind woman who saw the light.

11. Brigadier General Thomas F. Farrell was at the control shelter located 10,000 yards south of the point of explosion. His impressions are given below:

SAC
IX "The scene inside the shelter was dramatic beyond words. In and around the shelter were some twenty-odd people concerned with last minute arrangements prior to firing the shot. Included were Dr. Oppenheimer, the Director who had borne the great scientific burden of



Memorandum for Secretary of War

16 July 1945.

overlooking the ascent from the raw materials etc. in Tennessee and Washington and a dozen of his key servants -- Dr. Kistiakowski, who developed the highly special aluminum in Peabody, who supervised all the detailed arrangements for the test; Dr. Hubbard, the shelter expert, and several others. Besides these, there were a handful of soldiers, two or three Army officers and one Naval officer. The shelter was cluttered with a great variety of instruments and radios.

For some hours the two hours preceding the blast, General Groves stayed with the Director, talking with him and steadyng his tense excitement. Every time the Director would be about to expire because of some untoward happening, General Groves would take him off and walk with him in the rain, counsilling with him and reassuring him that everything would be all right. At twenty minutes before zero hour, General Groves left for his station at the base camp, first because it provided a better observation point and second, because of our rule that he and I must not go together in flight; we were there in an element of danger, which existed at both points.

Just after General Groves left, announcements began to be broadcast of the interval remaining before the blast. They were sent by radio to the other groups participating in and observing the test. As the time interval grew smaller and changed from minutes to seconds, the tension increased by leaps and bounds. Everyone in that room knew the awful potentialities of the thing that they thought was about to happen. The scientists felt that their figuring must be right and



18 July 1945

I
18
Well

that the bomb had to go off but there was in everyone's mind a strong measure of doubt. The feeling of many could be expressed by "Lord, I believe; help Them make umbalief." We were reaching into the unknown and we did not know what might come of it. It can be safely said that most of those present—Christian, Jew and atheist—were praying and praying harder than they had ever prayed before. If the shot were successful, it was a justification of the several years of intensive effort of tens of thousands of people—statesmen, scientists, engineers, manufacturers, soldiers, and many others in every walk of life.

I
18

In that brief instant in the remote New Mexico desert the tremendous effort of the brains and brawn of all these people came suddenly and startlingly to the fullest fruition. Dr. Oppenheimer, on whom had rested a very heavy burden, grew tenser as the last seconds ticked off. He scarcely breathed. He held on to a post to steady himself. For the last few seconds, he stared directly ahead and then when the announcer shouted "Blast!" and there came this tremendous burst of light followed shortly thereafter by the deep growling roar of the explosion, his face relaxed into an expression of tremendous relief. Several of the observers standing back of the shelter to watch the lighting effects were knocked flat by the blast. ✓

"The tension in the room let up and all started congratulating each other. Everyone sensed "This is it!" No matter what might happen now all knew that the impossible scientific job had been done. Atomic fission would no longer be hidden in the cloisters of the theoretical physicists' dreams. It was almost full grown at birth. It was a great,

Memorandum for Secretary of War

18 July 1945.

new force to be used for good or for evil. There was a feeling in that shelter that those concerned with its activity should dedicate their lives to the mission that it would always be used for good and never for evil.

*... a man and his wife professor in
Medicine and Surgery*

"Dr. Kistiakowsky, the impulsive Russian, threw his arms around Dr. Oppenheimer and embraced him with shouts of glee. Others were equally enthusiastic. All the pent-up emotions were released in those few minutes and all seemed to sense immediately that the explosion had far exceeded the most optimistic expectations and wildest hopes of the scientists. All seemed to feel that they had been present at the birth of a new age—The Age of Atomic Energy—and felt their profound responsibility to help in guiding into right channels the tremendous forces which had been unlocked for the first time in history.

XI As to the present war, there was a feeling that no matter what else might happen, we now had the means to insure its speedy conclusion and save thousands of American lives. As to the future, there had been brought into being something big and something new that would prove to be immeasurably more important than the discovery of electricity or any of the other great discoveries which have so affected our existence.

XII The effects could well be called unprecedented, magnificent, beautiful, stupendous and terrifying. No man-made phenomenon of such tremendous power had ever occurred before. The lighting effects beggared description. The whole country was lighted by a searing light

Memorandum for Secretary of War

18 July 1945.

X with the intensity many times that of the midday sun. It was golden, purple, violet, gray and blue. It lit up every peak, crag and ridge of the nearby mountain range with a clarity and beauty that cannot be described but must be seen to be imagined. It was that beauty the great poets dream about but describe most poorly and inadequately. Thirty seconds after the explosion came first, the air blast pressing hard against the people and things, to be followed almost immediately by the strong, sustained, awesome roar which warned of doomsday and made us feel that we poor things were insipid and tame in comparison with the forces heretofore reserved to the Almighty. Words are inadequate tools for the job of acquainting those not present with the physical, mental and psychological effects. It had to be witnessed to be realized."

VII 12. My impressions of the night's high points follow:

After about an hour's sleep I got up at 0100 and from that time on until about five I was with Dr. Oppenheimer constantly. Naturally he was nervous, although his mind was working at its usual extraordinary efficiency. I devoted my entire attention to shielding him from the excited and generally faulty advice of his assistants who were more than disturbed by their excitement and the uncertain weather conditions. By 0330 we decided that we could probably fire at 0530. By 0400 the rain had stopped but the sky was heavily overcast. Our decision became firmer as time went on. During most of these hours the two of us journeyed from the control house out into the darkness to look

JWES
Memorandum for Secretary of War

18 July 1945.

at the stars and to assure each other that the one or two visible stars were becoming brighter. At 0510 I left Dr. Oppenheimer and returned to the main observation point which was 17,000 yards from the point of explosion. In accordance with our orders I found all personnel not otherwise occupied passed on a bit of high ground.

At about ten minutes of the scheduled firing time all persons lay face down with their feet pointing towards the explosion. As the remaining time was called from the loud speaker from the 10,000 yard control station there was complete silence. Dr. Compton said he had never imagined seconds could be so long. Most of the individuals in accordance with orders shielded their eyes in one way or another. There was then this burst of light of a brilliancy beyond any comparison. We all rolled over and looked through dark glasses at the ball of fire. About forty seconds later came the shock wave followed by the sound, neither of which seemed startling after our complete astonishment at the extraordinary lighting intensity. Dr. Compton reached over and we shook hands in mutual congratulations. Dr. Bush, who was on the other side of me, did likewise. The feeling of the entire assembly was similar to that described by General Farrell, with even the uninitiated feeling profound awe. Drs. Compton and Bush and myself were struck by an even stronger feeling that the faith of those who had been responsible for the initiation and the carrying on of this Herculean project had been justified. I personally thought of Blaeding crossing Niagara Falls on his tight rope, only to see this tight rope had lasted for almost

18 July 1945.

three years and of my repeated confident-appearing assurances that such a thing was possible and that we could do it.

13. A large group of observers were stationed at a point about 27 miles north of the point of explosion. Attached is a memorandum written shortly after the explosion by Mr. E. G. Lawrence which may be of interest.

14. While General Farrell was waiting about midnight for a commercial airplane to Washington at Albuquerque—120 miles away from the site—he overheard several airport employees discussing their reaction to the blast. One said that he was out on the parking apron; it was quite dark; then the whole southern sky was lighted as though by a bright sun; the light lasted several seconds. Another remarked that if a few exploding bombs could have such an effect, it must be terrible to have them drop on a city.

15. My liaison officer at the Alamogordo Air Base, 60 miles away, made the following report:

"There was a blinding flash of light that lighted the entire northeastern sky. In the center of the flash, there appeared to be a huge billow of smoke. The original flash lasted approximately 10 to 15 seconds. As the first flash died down, there arose in the approximate center of where the original flash had occurred an enormous ball of what appeared to be fire and closely resembled a rising sun that was three-fourths above a mountain. The ball of fire lasted approximately 15 seconds, then died down and the sky resumed an almost normal appearance.

16 July 1945.

"Almost immediately, a third, but much smaller, flash and
pillow of smoke of a whitish-orange color appeared in the sky, again
lighting the sky for approximately 4 seconds. At the time of the
original flash, the field was lighted well enough so that a newspaper
could easily have been read. The second and third flashes were of
much lesser intensity.

"We were in a glass-enclosed control tower some 70 feet above
the ground and felt no concussion or air compression. There was an
unnoticeable earth tremor although reports overheard at the Field during
the following 24 hours indicated that some believed that they had both
heard the explosion and felt some earth tremor."

16. I have not written a separate report for General Marshall as
I feel you will want to show this to him. I have informed the necessary
people here of our results. Lord Halifax after discussion with Mr.
Harrison and myself stated that he was not sending a full report to his
government at this time. I informed him that I was sending this to
you and that you might wish to show it to the proper British representa-
tives.

17. We are all fully conscious that our real goal is still before
us. The battle test is what counts in the war with Japan.

18. May I express my deep personal appreciation for your congratula-
tory cable to us and for the support and confidence which I have received
from you ever since I have had this work under my charge.

Memorandum for Secretary of War

16 July 1945.

19. I know that Colonel Ayle will guard these papers with his customary extraordinary care.

L. E. GROVES,
Major General, USA.

4 Inclosures:

- Sketch
- Picture
- News Release
- Statement by E. O. Lawrence

JULY 16, 1945

CLOUD
DRAWINGS

frontal system
light
low - m.
showy, M.M.
shallow, low
3-4° layer of
3-4°, flat, flat
is adiabatic.



170° come away

0 = 5:30 AM

today toward 30°

5:30 AM


about 24,000 ft.

undulant.



150°
today 16°
5:42 AM

as thoughts





July 17 '45

Just spent a couple of hours with Stalin.
Our Doves called on him and made the date
of eight pm now today. Was off a few minutes
you know I hopped up from the deck and
here stood Stalin at the doorway. I put on my
gloves and advanced to meet him. He put out
his hand and smiled. I did the same, we had
a quiet of courtesy at the interpreter and
we sat down. After the usual politico speech
we got down to business. told Stalin that
I am a diplomat but usually said good
by greetings after leaving all the agreements
he placed his hand over it he said "I agree
to you the matter". he said he had read that
he had come over specifically to present
I told him to fire away. I did not say it is dyn-
astic but I have some disagreement which he
not explaining now he wants to fire Feager, he
wishes a world of street and don't up the Italian
woman, and other broads, some say don't that
the British have. They do get on the finer
squares told us what a screwball had been
needed and what was on appearance. Most of the
big points are settled. He'll be in the top floor
at August 15th. Four days after that address at
the last hotel takes his place put on a uniform
driving boats to everyone they had instances make
in the deck and. I can get with Stalin. He is
tough but not as tall.

July 18, 45

At breakfast with Stephen. Having a conference
in the Full Assembly. He is a good soldier and a
man for the job. They took him off Suzy's flight at Grees
and flew him free. Landing like a buzzard.
Heed & Ladd, with O. D. at 1:30, walked over to
Central Hippo. Met at the gate by Dr. Charles H. Gould
of Boston. Drove up. Big body of men. Scott of Guards
had played Star Spangled Banner. Imported Guard
and went in for lunch. P. M. D. ate alone. Toured
Operation (it is a mess). Decided to tell Stalin
about it. Stalin had told O. D. of program for U.S.
Emphasizing for peace. Stalin also read his ad-
dress to me. It was interesting. Believe Japs will
fold up before Russia comes in.

Very easy they will offer their hands open
over their homeland. Fall in front. Stalin did
it at an opportunity time. Stalin has been
you an opportunity meeting. Dared to bring
to come to the U.S. Told him I'd send the Cattell
Picornini for him if he does. He said he wanted
to cooperate with U.S. in peace as we had co-
operated in war but it would be harder. As
he was greatly succeeded in U.S. and I
was instrumental in Russia. Told him that
we each could help to ready that situation
in our favor, certainly and that I intended
to try with all I had to do my part at home.
He gave me a most radical Opanile and said
he would do as much in Russia.

We then went to the conference and after

my job to present the Minister's proposal
and make three year term proposals and
I delayed this though I got orders much
to the surprise of Mr. Churchill. Stakas was
very much pleased. Churchill was too after
he had recovered. You are going to stay around
this terrible place all summer just to listen
to speeches. Oh go home! The Secretariat

July 25 1945

The next at 11 A.M. Today That is Stela Churchill
and the U.S. President. But I had a most important
vision with Lord Woolfson & General Marshall before
that. We have discussed the most terrible bomb in the
history of the world. It may be the fire destruction applied
in the Empire's Valley. Ere, after four and a half hours talk.

Any way we think we have found the way to cause a fire
explosion of the atom. An experiment in the fortress
except of any starting - to put it simply. Three pounds
of the explosive caused the complete destruction of our
fortress 60 feet high, created a crater 6 feet deep and
60 feet in diameter, looked over a steel base 3 miles
away and looked over town 10,000 yards away. The
explosion was visible for more than 200 miles and
audible for 60 miles and more.

This weapon is to be used against Japan fifteen
days and August 15th. Please tell the Sec. of War to dismiss
to you it so that military, dentists and soldiers and
nurses are the target and not women and children. These
are the boys, not the girls, mothers, nurses and fathers, men,
and the leader of the world for the conversion, helping convert
them to terrible bond on the old God of the sea.

He & I am in accord. The target will be a general at.
They are and we will need a warning shot. In
most ports of the Japanese empire and after this, I am
sure they will not do that but we will have given
them the chance. It is certainly a good thing for the
world that Hitler's crowd or Hitler didn't invent this
atomic bomb. It seems to be the most tyrannical thing
ever dreamed, but if can be made to control.

55

This is the place I
told Stalau about the
Atom Bomb which was
exploded July 16, 1945
in New Mexico. He didn't
believe it at first but I was
talking it out!

HST

43-767



in which I tell Stalin
we expect to do the most
profound experiments ever made on
the Japanese. He smiled and said
he appreciated my telling him --
but he did not know that I was
talking about the Human Brain!

H.S.T.



US FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING ██████████ MESSAGE

URGENT

FROM: AGOAR Washington

TO: A. Tripartite Conference Berlinberg, Germany

NO. WAR 40201

30 July 1945.

To the President from the Secretary of War.

The time schedule on German project is progressing so rapidly that it is now essential that statement for release by you be available not later than Wednesday, 1 August. I have revised draft of statement, which I previously presented to you, in light of

- (A) Your recent ultimatum,
- (B) German results of test and
- (C) Certain minor suggestion made by British of which Byrne is aware.

While I am planning to start a copy by special courier tomorrow in the hope you can be reached, nevertheless in the event we do not reach you in time, I will appreciate having your authority to have White House release revised statement as soon as necessary.

Sorry circumstances seem to require this emergency release.

ACTION: Dear General

See over.

VICTORY-10-733

(31 July 1945)

302217Z

GP

RELEASER
NO. 1000 Sec 100 and 100-100

On hand May 2, 1945

Approved, *John C. Gandy*

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS PROHIBITED

JOHN C. GANDY, SECRETARY
GEORGE A. MAYER

See War

Reply to your 4/10/11
suggestions approved
Release when ready
but not sooner than
August 2.

HST



Perla, July 31, 1945

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON D.C.

Dear Mrs. - It was surely good to talk with you this morning at 7 A.M. It is hard to think that it is 11 P.M. yesterday where you are. The weather has not been so good this morning on account of the storm, over the Atlantic.

We have been going great guns the last day or two and while the Captain was at a standstill because of Black Joe's indisposition, the all the time Mr. Hobson and Mr. Price & I worked and accomplished a great deal. Rather think Mr. Hobson wasstellen to cause he is not so happy over the English elections. He does not know if

but I have as all in the lot and
another one showing - so called the
three or two pairs and I know he has
not) we are sitting all right.

The whole difficulty is separation. Of
course the Russians are naturally bitter
and they have been thoroughly indoctrinated by the
Soviets, etc. and etc. - go on and you
can hardly blame them for their attitude.
Indeed the thing I have to do is to try
keep our skirts clear and make no
concessions.

The Poles are the other headache. They
have moved into East Prussia and to
the Oder in Prussia and numbers are
increasing to go to war again - they



can stay and they will stay with
Bublinski talking - so you see no more
old man separations again and a
completely German both of Poland

Genes, Leib and I have worked
out a program I think to fit a
bad situation. We should reach a
tentative agreement in the Big Three
this afternoon and final one tomorrow
and be on the way Thursday and
surely not later than Friday.

We are leaving from the south
England which gives us 48 hours start
of leaving from Katowic. So if we
get invited from the stock Friday
afternoon by Thursday we'll be in



Norfolk and Washington the next day
in the morning. It may be possible
of course to be a day sooner but
I am giving you the extreme
limit. The last general census here
today and one will leave the boat
when we get on it. But unless
there's about eight say to ten days time.

I'll soon be glad to see you and
the Whole House and be where I can
at least go to bed without being watched
like my baby lots lots of love

Henry

I've got to head off the Long King
when I get to the mouth.

Part I - Psychological Warfare

1. Below is a copy of the first leaflet (A-11) which was dropped on Japanese cities in conjunction with the atomic bomb.

2. A translation of the above leaflet follows:

TO THE JAPANESE PEOPLE:

Please note that you take immediate heed of what we say on this leaflet.

We are in possession of the most destructive explosive ever devised by man. A single one of our newly developed atomic bombs is actually the equivalent in explosive power to what 4000 of our giant 2000 ton navy or a single division. This awful fact is one for you to ponder and we definitely assure you it is grimly accurate.

We have just begun to use this weapon against your homeland. If you still have any doubt, ask inquiry as to what happened to Hiroshima when just one atomic bomb fell on that city.

Before using this bomb to destroy every resource of the military by which they are prolonging this accursed war, we ask that you accept from the Emperor to end the war. Our President has outlined for you the thirteen consequences of an honorable surrender. We urge that you accept these consequences and begin the work of building a new, better, and peace-loving Japan.

"You should take steps now to avoid military resistance. Doing so, we shall immediately replace this bomb and all other superior weapons to promptly and peacefully end the war."

STAFF IN TOKYO OFFICE

3. Below is a copy of the second leaflet (A-12) which was dropped on Japanese cities in conjunction with the atomic bomb.

~~SECRET~~
REF ID: A6224 Jun 23, 1945
~~EDITED~~ ~~SECRET~~

INCLASIFIED
1945 Dir. Secy. to
Secy. of War, Dated 10
July 1945, File No. 11-2-277

7-4-2-2-2-2-2-2-2

4. A translation of the above leaflet follows:

"LETTER TO JAPANESE PEOPLE"

EVACUATE YOUR CITIES

"Because your military leaders have rejected the thirteen part surrender declaration, two momentous events have occurred in the last few days,

"The Soviet Union, because of this rejection on the part of the military has notified your Ambassador that it has declared war on your nation. Thus, all powerful countries of the world are now at war against you.

"Also, because of your leaders' refusal to accept the surrender declaration that would enable Japan to honorably end this useless war, we have employed our atomic bomb.

"A single one of our newly developed atomic bombs is actually the equivalent in explosive power to about 2000 of our giant B-29's could have carried on a single mission. Radio Tokyo has told you that with the first use of this weapon of total destruction, Hiroshima was virtually destroyed.

"Before we use this bomb again and again to destroy every resource of the military by which they are prolonging this useless war, petition the Emperor now to end the war. Our President has outlined for you the thirteen consequences of an honorable surrender. He urges that you accept those consequences and begin the work of building a new, better, and peace loving Japan.

"At at once or we shall relentlessly employ this bomb and all our other superior weapons to promptly and forcefully end the war."

EVACUATE YOUR CITIES

DDO DIR 54-116 Rev 12, 1945
[REDACTED] by [REDACTED] Date [REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED
DDO DIR 54-116 Rev 12, 1945
[REDACTED] by [REDACTED] Date [REDACTED]

-51-

I-D-B-2-2-4-3-2

THE WHITE HOUSE

Washington, D. C.

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Sixteen hours ago an American airplane dropped one bomb on _____ and destroyed its usefulness to the enemy. This bomb had more power than 20,000 tons of T.T.T. It had more than two thousand times the blast power of the British "Grand Slam" which is the largest bomb ever yet used in the history of warfare.

The Japanese began the war from the air at Pearl Harbor. They have been repaid many fold. And the end is not yet. With this bomb we have now added a new and revolutionary increase in destruction to supplement the growing power of our armed forces. In their present form these bombs are now in production and even more powerful forms are in development.

It is an atomic bomb. It is a harnessing of the basic power of the universe. The force from which the sun drives its power has been loosed against those who brought war to the Far East.

Before 1939, it was the accepted belief of scientists that it was theoretically possible to release atomic energy. But no one knew any practical method of doing it. By 1942, however, we knew that the Germans were working feverishly to find a way to add atomic energy to the other engines of war with which they hoped to enslave the world. But they failed. We may be grateful to Providence that the Germans got the V-1's and V-2's late and in limited quantities and even more grateful that they did not get the atomic bomb at all.

The battle of the laboratories held fateful risks for us as well as the battles of the air, land and sea, and we have now won the battle of the laboratories as we have won the other battles.

Beginning in 1940, before Pearl Harbor, scientific knowledge useful in war was pooled between the United States and Great Britain, and many priceless helps to our victories

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

Papers #1:
Eben A. Ayers

have come from that arrangement. Under that general policy the research on the atomic bomb was begun. With American and British scientists working together we entered the race of discovery against the Germans.

The United States had available the large number of scientists of distinction in the many needed areas of knowledge. It had the tremendous industrial and financial resources necessary for the project and they could be devoted to it without undue impairment of other vital war work. In the United States the laboratory work and the production plants, on which a substantial start had already been made, would be out of reach of enemy bombing, while at the time Britain was exposed to constant air attack and was still threatened with the possibility of invasion. For these reasons Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt agreed that it was wise to carry on the project here. We now have two great plants and many lesser works devoted to the production of atomic power. Employment during peak construction numbered 125,000 and over 65,000 individuals are even now engaged in operating the plants. Many have worked there for two and a half years. Few know what they have been producing. They see great quantities of material going in and they see nothing coming out of these plants, for the physical size of the explosive charge is exceedingly small. We have spent two billion dollars on the greatest scientific gamble in history -- And won.

But the greatest marvel is not the size of the enterprise, its secrecy, nor its cost, but the achievement of scientific brains in putting together infinitely complex pieces of knowledge held by many men in different fields of science into a workable plan, and hardly less marvellous has been the capacity of industry to design, and of labor to operate, the machines and methods to do things never done before so that the brain child of many minds came forth in physical shape and performed as it was supposed to do. Both science and industry worked under the direction of the United States Army, which achieved a unique success in managing so diverse a problem in the advancement of knowledge in an amazingly short time. It is doubtful if such another combination could be got together in the world. What has been done is the greatest achievement of organized science in history. It was done under high pressure and without failure.

We are now prepared to obliterate more rapidly and completely every productive enterprise the Japanese have above ground in any city. We shall destroy their docks, their factories, and their communications. Let there be no mistake; we shall completely destroy Japan's power to make war.

It was to spare the Japanese people from utter destruction that the ultimatum of July 26 was issued at Potsdam. Their leaders promptly rejected that ultimatum. If they do not now accept our terms they may expect a rain of rain from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth. Behind this air attack will follow sea and land forces in such numbers and power as they have not yet seen and with the fighting skill of which they are already well aware.

The Secretary of War, who has kept in personal touch with all phases of the project, will immediately make public a statement giving further details.

His statement will give facts concerning the sites at Oak Ridge near Knoxville, Tennessee, and at Richland near Pasco, Washington, and an installation near Santa Fe, New Mexico. Although the workers at the sites have been making materials to be used in producing the greatest destructive force in history they have not themselves been in danger beyond that of many other occupations, for the utmost care has been taken of their safety.

The fact that we can release atomic energy ushered in a new era in man's understanding of nature's forces. Atomic energy may in the future supplement the power that now comes from coal, oil, and falling water, but at present it cannot be produced on a basis to compete with them economically. Before that comes there must be a long period of intensive research.

It has never been the habit of the scientists of this country or the policy of this Government to withhold from the world scientific knowledge. Normally, therefore, everything about the work with atomic energy would be made public.

But under present circumstances it is not intended to divulge the technical processes of production or all the military applications, pending further examination of possible methods of protecting us and the rest of the world from the danger of sudden destruction.

I shall recommend that the Congress of the United States consider promptly the establishment of an appropriate commission to control the production and use of atomic power within the United States. I shall give further consideration and make further recommendations to the Congress as to how atomic power can become a powerful and forceful influence towards the maintenance of world peace.

STATEMENT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR

The recent use of the atomic bomb over Japan, which was today made known by the President, is the culmination of years of heroic and effort on the part of science and industry working in cooperation with the military authorities. This development which was carried forward by the many thousand participants with the utmost energy and the very highest sense of national duty, with the greatest secrecy and the most imperative of time schedules, probably represents the greatest achievement of the combined efforts of science, industry, labor, and the military in all history.

The military weapon which has been forged from the projects of this vast undertaking has an explosive force such as to stagger the imagination. Improvements will be forthcoming shortly which will increase by several fold the present effectiveness. But more important for the long-range implications of this new weapon, is the possibility that another scale of magnitude will be evolved after considerable research and development. The scientists are confident that over a period of many years atomic bombs may well be developed which will be very much more powerful than the atomic bombs now at hand. It is abundantly clear that the possession of this weapon by the United States even in its present form should prove a tremendous aid in the shortening of the war against Japan.

The requirements of security do not permit of any revelation at this time of the exact methods by which the bombs are produced or of the nature of their action. However, in accord with its policy of keeping the people of the nation as completely informed as is consistent with national security, the War Department wishes to make known at this time, at least in broad dimension, the story behind this tremendous weapon which has been developed so effectively to hasten the end of the war. Other statements will be released which will give further details concerning the scientific and production aspects of the project and will give proper recognition to the scientists, technicians, and the men of industry and labor who have made this weapon possible.

The chain of scientific discovery which has led to the atomic bomb began at the turn of the century when radio-activity was discovered. Until 1939 work in this field was world-wide, being carried on particularly in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy and Denmark.

Before the Eighth went out over Europe and the advent of war imposed security restrictions, the fundamental scientific knowledge concerning atomic energy from which has been developed the atomic bomb now in use by the United States was widely known in many countries, both Allied and Axis. The war, however, ended the exchange of scientific

Information on this subject and, with the exception of the United Kingdom and Canada, the status of work in this field in other countries is not fully known, but we are convinced that Japan will not be in a position to use an atomic bomb in this war. While it is known that Germany was working feverishly in an attempt to develop such a weapon, her complete defeat and occupation has now removed that source of danger. Thus it was evident when the war began that the development of atomic energy for war purposes would occur in the near future and it was a question of which nations would control the discovery.

A large number of American scientists were pressing forward the boundaries of scientific knowledge in this fertile new field at the time when American science was utilized for war. Work on atomic fission was also in progress in the United Kingdom when the war began in Europe. A close connection was maintained between the British investigations and the work here, with a pooling of information on this as on other matters of scientific research of importance for military purposes. It was later agreed between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill that the project would be best quickly and effectively brought to fruition if all effort were concentrated in the United States, thus ensuring intimate collaboration and also avoiding duplication. As a consequence of this decision, a number of British scientists who had been working on this problem were transferred here in late 1941, and they have from that time participated in the development of the project in the United States.

II.

Late in 1939 the possibility of using atomic energy for military purposes was brought to the attention of President Roosevelt. He appointed a committee to survey the problem. Research which had been conducted on a small scale with Navy funds was put on a full scale basis as a result of the recommendations of various scientific committees. At the end of 1941 the decision was made to go all-out on research work, and the project was put under the direction of a group of eminent American scientists in the Office of Scientific Research and Development, with all projects in operation being placed under contract with the OSRD. Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director of OSRD, reported directly to the President on major developments. Meanwhile, President Roosevelt appointed a General Policy Group, which consisted of former Vice President Harry A. Wallace, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, General George C. Marshall, Dr. James B. Conant, and Dr. Bush. In June 1942 this group recommended a great expansion of the work and the transfer of the major part of the program to the War Department. These recommendations were approved by President Roosevelt and put into effect. Major General Leslie R. Groves was appointed by the Secretary of War to take complete executive charge of the program and was made directly responsible to him and the Chief of Staff. In order to secure continuing consideration to the

military aspects of the program, the President's General Policy Group appointed a Military Policy Committee consisting of Mr. Bush as Chairman with Dr. Conant as his alternate, Lt. General Wilhelm R. Styer, and Rear Admiral William R. Purnell. This Committee was charged with the responsibility of considering and planning military policy relating to the program including the development and manufacture of material, the production of atomic fission bombs, and their use as a weapon.

Although there were still numerous unsolved problems concerning the several theoretically possible methods of producing explosive material, nevertheless, in view of the tremendous pressure of time it was decided in December 1943 to proceed with the construction of large scale plants. Two of these are located at the Clinton Engineer Works in Tennessee and a third is located at the Hanford Engineer Works in the State of Washington. The decision to embark on large scale production at such an early stage was, of course, a gamble, but as it so necessary in our calculated risk was taken and the risk paid off.

The Clinton Engineer Works is located on a Government reservation of some 59,000 acres eighteen miles west of Knoxville, Tennessee. The large size and isolated location of this site was made necessary by the need for security and for safety against possible, but then unknown, hazards. A Government-owned and operated city, named Oak Ridge, was established within the reservation to accommodate the people working on the project. They live under normal conditions in modest houses, dormitories, barracks, and trailers, and have for their use all the religious, recreational, educational, medical, and other facilities of a modern small city. The total population of Oak Ridge is approximately 75,000 and consists of construction workers and plant operators and their immediate families; others live in immediately surrounding communities.

The Hanford Engineer Works is located on a Government reservation of 430,000 acres in an isolated area fifteen miles northwest of Pasco, Washington. Here is situated a Government-owned and operated town called Richland with a population of approximately 17,000 consisting of plant operators and their immediate families. As in the case of the site in Tennessee, consideration of security and safety necessitated placing this site in an isolated area. Living conditions in Richland are similar to those in Oak Ridge.

A special laboratory dealing with the many technical problems involved in putting the components together into an effective bomb is located in an isolated area, in the vicinity of Santa Fe, New Mexico. This laboratory has been planned, organized, and directed by Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer. The development of the bomb itself has been largely due to his genius and the inspiration and leadership he has given to his associates.

Certain other manufacturing plants much smaller in scale are located in the United States and in Canada for essential production of

needed materials. Laboratories at the Universities of Columbia, Chicago, and California, Iowa State College, and at other schools as well as certain industrial laboratories have contributed materially in carrying on research and in developing special equipment, materials, and processes for the project. A laboratory has been established in Canada and a pilot plant for the manufacture of material is being built. This work is being carried on by the Canadian Government with assistance from, and appropriate liaison with, the United States and the United Kingdom.

While space does not permit of a complete listing of the industrial concerns which have contributed so signalily to the success of the project, mention should be made of a few. The du Pont de Nemours Company designed and constructed the Tuxford installations in Washington and operate them. A special subsidiary of the W. M. Hellweg Company of New York designed one of the plants at Clinton, which was constructed by the J. A. Jones Company and is operated by the Union Carbide and Carbon Company. The second plant at Clinton was designed and constructed by the Goss and Webster Engineering Corporation of Boston and is operated by the Tennessee Eastman Company. Equipment was supplied by almost all of the important firms in the United States, including Allis-Chalmers, Chrysler, General Electric, and Westinghouse. These are only a few of the literally thousands of firms, both large and small, which have contributed to the success of the program. It is hoped that one day it will be possible to reveal in greater detail the contributions made by industry to the successful development of this weapon.

Behind these concrete achievements lie the tremendous contributions of American science. No praise is too great for the untiring efforts, brilliant achievements, and complete devotion to the national interest of the scientists of this country. Nowhere else in the world has science performed so successfully in time of war. All the men of science who have cooperated effectively with industry and the military authorities in bringing the project of fruition merit the very highest expression of gratitude from the people of the nation.

In the War Department the main responsibility for the successful prosecution of the program rests with Major General Leslie R. Groves. His record of performance in securing the effective development of this weapon for our allied forces in so short a period of time has been truly outstanding and merits the very highest commendation.

III.

From the outset extraordinary secrecy and security measures have surrounded the project. This was personally ordered by President Roosevelt and his orders have been strictly complied with. The work has been completely compartmentalized so that while many thousands of people have been associated with the program in one way or another no one has been given more information concerning it than was absolutely necessary

to his particular job. As a result only a few highly placed persons in Government and science know the entire story. It was inevitable, of course, that public curiosity would be aroused concerning so large a project and that citizens would make inquiries of Members of Congress. In such instances the Members of Congress have been most cooperative and have accepted in good faith the statement of the War Department that military security precluded any disclosure of detailed information.

In the appropriation of funds, the Congress has accepted the assurances of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff that the appropriations made were absolutely essential to national security. The War Department is confident that the Congress will agree that its faith was not a mistake. Because it has not been possible for Congress to keep a close check on the expenditures of the funds appropriated for the project which to June 30, 1945, amounted to \$1,950,000,000, key scientific phases of the work have been reviewed from time to time by eminent qualified scientists and industrial leaders in order to be certain that the expenditures were warranted by the potentialities of the progress.

The press and radio of the nation, as in so many other instances, have complied wholeheartedly with the requests of the Office of Censorship that publicity on any phase of this subject be suppressed.

IV.

In order to bring the project to fruition as quickly as possible, it was decided in August 1943 to establish a Combined Policy Committee with the following membership: Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Dr. Vannevar Bush, and Dr. James B. Conant, for the United States; Field Marshal Sir John Dill and Colonel J. J. Lovell*llia, for the United Kingdom; and Mr. C. D. Howe, for Canada. The Committee is responsible for the broad direction of the project as between the countries. Interchange of information has been provided for within certain limits. In the field of scientific research and development full interchange is maintained between those working in the same sections of the field; in matters of design, construction and operation of large scale plants information is exchanged only when such exchange will hasten the completion of weapons for use in the present war. All these arrangements are subject to the approval of the Combined Policy Committee. The United States members have had as their scientific adviser Mr. Richard C. Tolman; the British members, Sir James Chadwick; and the Canadian member, Dean G. J. MacKenzie.

It was early recognized that in order to make certain that this tremendous weapon would not fall into the hands of the enemy prompt

* Colonel Lovell was replaced by Sir Ronald I. Campbell in December 1943 and the latter, in turn, by the Earl of Halifax. The late Field Marshal Sir John Dill was replaced by Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson early in 1945.

action should be taken to control patents in the field and to secure control over the ore which is indispensable to the process. Substantial patent control has been accomplished in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. In each country all personnel engaged in the work, both scientific and industrial, are required to assign their entire rights to any inventions in this field to their respective governments. Arrangements have been made for appropriate patent exchange in instances where inventions are made by nationals of one country working in the territory of another. Such patent rights, interests, and titles as are exchanged, however, are held in a fiduciary sense subject to settlement at a later date on mutually satisfactory terms. All patent actions taken are surrounded by all safeguards necessary for the security of the project. At the present stage of development of the science of atomic fission, uranium is the ore essential to the production of the weapon. Steps have been taken, and continue to be taken, to assure up of adequate supplies of this mineral.

V.

Atomic fission holds great promise for sweeping developments by which our civilization may be enriched when peace comes, but the overriding necessities of war have precluded the full exploration of peaceful applications of this new knowledge. With the evidence presently at hand, however, it appears inevitable that many useful contributions to the well-being of mankind will ultimately flow from these discoveries when the world situation makes it possible for science and industry to concentrate on these purposes.

The fact that atomic energy can now be released on a large scale in an atomic bomb raises the question of the prospect of using this energy for peaceful industrial purposes. Already in the course of producing one of the elements such energy is being released, not explosively but in regulated amounts. This energy, however, is in the form of heat at a temperature too low to make practicable the operation of a conventional power plant. It will be a matter of much further research and development to design machines for the conversion of atomic energy into useful power. How long this will take no one can predict but it will certainly be a period of many years. Furthermore, there are many economic considerations to be taken into account before we can say to what extent atomic energy will supplant coal, oil, and water as fundamental sources of power in industry in this or any other country. We are at the threshold of a new industrial art which will take many years and much expenditure of money to develop.

Because of the widespread knowledge and interest in this subject even before the war, there is no possibility of avoiding the risks inherent in this knowledge by any long-term policy of secrecy. Mindful of these considerations as well as the grave problems that arise concerning the control of the weapon and the implications of this science for the peace of the world, the Secretary of War, with the approval of the President,

been appointed an Interim Committee to consider these matters. Membership of the Committee is as follows: The Secretary of War, Chairman; the Honorable James F. Byrnes, now Secretary of State; the Honorable Ralph A. Bard, former Under Secretary of the Navy; the Honorable William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State; Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development and President of the Carnegie Institution of Washington; Dr. James B. Conant, Chairman of the National Defense Research Commission and President of Harvard University; Dr. Earl R. Compton, Chief of the Office of Field Service in the Office of Scientific Research and Development and President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and Mr. George E. Harrison, Special Consultant to the Secretary of War and President of the New York Life Insurance Company. Mr. Harrison is alternate Chairman of the Committee.

The Committee is charged with the responsibility of formulating recommendations to the President concerning the post-war organization that should be established to direct and control the future course of the United States in this field both with regard to the research and developmental aspects of the entire field and to its military applications. It will make recommendations with regard to the problems of both national and international control. In its consideration of these questions, the Committee has had the benefit of the views of the scientists who have participated in the project. These views have been brought to the attention of the Committee by an advisory group selected from the leading physicists of the country who have been most active on this subject. This group is composed of Dr. J. D. Cockcroft, Dr. E. O. Lawrence, Dr. A. H. Compton, and Dr. Enrico Fermi. The Interim Committee has also consulted the representatives of those industries which have been most closely connected with the multitude of problems that have been faced in the production phases of the project. Every effort is being bent toward ensuring that this weapon and the new field of science that stands behind it will be employed wisely in the interests of the security of peace-loving nations and the well-being of the world.

Dr. [unclear]
Laddie

AM 7 9 AM FEB 1

INFO TO SCY

INDEXED ON AMT 4277

THE PRESIDENT

PERSONAL DELIVERY, THE WHITE HOUSE
PERMIT ME TO RESPECTFULLY SUGGEST THAT WE CEASE OUR EFFORTS TO
CAJOLE JAPAN INTO SURRENDERING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE POTSDEA
DECLARATION. LET US CARRY THE WAR TO THEM UNTIL THEY SEE US TO
ACCEPT THE UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER. THE TOLL ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR BROUGHT US INTO WAR AND I AM UNABLE TO SEE ANY VALID
REASON WHY WE SHOULD BE SO MUCH MORE CONSIDERATE AND LENIENT
IN DEALING WITH JAPAN THAN WITH GERMANY. I DARNISLY INSIST
JAPAN SHOULD BE DEALT WITH AS HARSHLY AS GERMANY AND THAT SHE

SHOULD NOT BE THE BENEFICIARY OF A SOFT PEACE. THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, INCLUDING FAIRLY SOUND THINKERS WHO HAVE INTIMATE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ORIGIN, DO NOT AGREE WITH DR. GORE IN HIS ATTITUDE THAT THERE IS ANYTHING SACROSANCT ABOUT HIROKITO. HE SHOULD GO. WE HAVE NO OBLIGATION TO SHINTOISM. THE CONFIDENTIAL ANSWER OF THE JAPS TO THE POTSDAM DECLARATION JUSTIFIES A REVISION OF THAT DOCUMENT AND STERNER PEACE TERMS.

IF WE DO NOT HAVE AVAILABLE A SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF ATOMIC BOMBS WITH WHICH TO FINISH THE JOB IMMEDIATELY, LET US CARRY ON WITH TNT AND FIRE BOMBS UNTIL WE CAN PRODUCE THEM.

I ALSO HOPE THAT YOU WILL ISSUE ORDERS FOR KIDDING THE OFFICERS IN COMMAND OF OUR AIR FORCES FROM WARNING JAP CITIES

THAT THEY WILL BE ATTACKED. THESE ORDERS DO NOT PUT OVER JAPAN
AND THIS SHOWDOWN IF CAN ONLY RESULT IN THE UNNECESSARY LOSS OF
MANY FINE MEN IN OUR AIR FORCE AS WELL AS OUR HELPLESS PRISONERS
IN THE HANDS OF THE JAPANESE, INCLUDING THE SURVIVORS OF THE MARCH
OF DEATH ON BATAAN WHO ARE CERTAIN TO BE BROUGHT INTO THE CITIES
THAT HAVE BEEN BURNED.

THIS WAS A TOTAL WAR AS LONG AS OUR ENEMIES HELD ALL OF THE
CARPS. WHY SHOULD WE CHANGE THE RULES NOW, AFTER THE BLOOD,
TREASURE AND ENTERPRISE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE GIVEN US THE
UPPER HAND. OUR PEOPLE HAVE NOT FORGOTTEN THAT THE JAPANESE STRUCK
US THE FIRST BLOW IN THIS WAR WITHOUT THE SLIGHTEST WARNING. I MY
SELF BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO STRIKE THE JAPANESE UNTIL THEY

ARE MOUNT SHASTA TO THEIR KNEES. A SHOUT CALLS UP APPEAL
TO JAPAN TO SIT FOR PEACE. THE NEXT PLEA FOR PEACE SHOULD COME
FROM AN OFFICER DESTROYED TOKYO. WHICH WOULD NOW. WITH ASSISTAN-
CES OF ZEPPELN

RICHARD E. RUSSELL BE SPOTTED.

THE ORIGINAL OF THIS DOCUMENT
IS IN THE SECURITY FILE OF
THE HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY



197

Miss.

August 9, 1945

Dear Dixie:

I read your telegram of August seventh with a lot of interest.

I know that Japan is a terribly cruel and uncivilized nation in warfare but I can't bring myself to believe that, because they are beasts, we should ourselves act in the same manner.

A 197

8/10/45

For myself, I certainly regret the necessity of wiping out whole populations because of the "cruelty" of the leaders of a nation and, for your information, I am not going to do it unless it is absolutely necessary. It is my opinion that after the Russians enter Korea, the Japanese will very shortly fold up.

K 220

My object is to save as many American lives as possible but I also have a humane feeling for the women and children in Japan.

X 198

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Honorable Richard B. Russell, A.P.P.-H72
Winder
Georgia

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Official File

WIK NEW YORK NY AUG 9 1945 1046A


HONORABLE HARRY S TRUMAN

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES THE WHITE HOUSE
MY CHRISTIANS DEEPLY DISTURBED OVER USE OF ATOMIC BOMBS
AGAINST JAPANESE CITIES BECAUSE OF THEIR NECESSARILY
INDESTRUCTIVE DESTRUCTIVE EFFORTS AND BECAUSE THEIR USE SETS
EXTREMELY DANGEROUS PRECEDENT FOR FUTURE OF WARFARE. LUDWIG
SCHAUER PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL AND JOHN FOSTER DAVIS CHAIRMAN
OF ITS COMMISSION ON A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE ARE PREPARING
STATEMENT FOR PROMPT RELEASE TOMORROW URGING THAT ATOMIC
BOMBS BE REGARDED AS TRUST FOR HUMANITY AND THAT JAPANESE



HATION BE GIVEN GENUINE OPPORTUNITY AND TIME TO VERIFY FACTS
ABOUT NEW BOMB AND TO ACCEPT SURRENDER TERMS. RESPECTFULLY
URGE THAT AMPLE OPPORTUNITY BE GIVEN JAPAN TO RECONSIDER
ULTIMATUM BEFORE ANY FURTHER DEVASTATION BY ATOMIC BOMB IS
VISITED UPON HER PEOPLE.

FEDERAL COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN AMERICA
SAMUEL MOORE CAVETT GENERAL SECRETARY.



692-A

August 11, 1945

My dear Mr. Gavort:

I appreciated very much your telegram of August ninth.

Nobody is more disturbed over the use of atomic bombs than I am but I was greatly disturbed over the unprovoked attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor and their murder of our prisoners of war. The only language they seem to understand is the one we have been using to bombard them.

r 117-15
A 197-1945
1 400 Hawaii
F.D.R. H.A. 26
1190-2

When you have to deal with a beast you have ~~to~~ to treat him as a beast. It is most regrettable but nevertheless true.

Fincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Mr. Edward McCrea Gavort
General Secretary
Federal Council of
The Churches of Christ in America
New York City, New York

117-33
A 212



692-A-Misc.

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Official File

WHITE HOUSE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON

September 6, 1945

MS SEP 10 PM 12 '45

J. C. T.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

THE CHIEF OF STAFF, THE WHITE HOUSE,
Secretary of State.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I enclose herewith correspondence
addressed to me by Mr. Lee Sattler of the
Metallurgical Laboratory, Chicago, Illinois.
I believe you are familiar with these papers.
I will appreciate it very much if you will
be good enough to write him direct, stating
that this correspondence had been brought to
your attention by this office.

Thank you.

W. J. CONNELL
Secretary to the President.

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DOCUMENT FILE

Metallurgical Laboratory

U. S. Steel Corp.
Carnegie-Illinoian Division

RECORDED - 1945

August 17, 1945

Mr. Matthew J. Connelly
The White House
Washington, D. C.

47 944

Dear Mr. Connelly:

When Mr. Barthky and I called on you on May 25, you were kind enough to arrange an interview with Mr. Byrnes, W. C. Gray of Columbia University, Walter Barthky of the University of Chicago, and I saw Byrnes on May 26 and submitted to him a memorandum dated Spring, 1945 which was originally prepared for Mr. Roosevelt and which you have read. We are very grateful to you for the opportunity to present our views to Mr. Byrnes.

The enclosed envelope contains Mr. Einstein's letter, returned by Mr. Byrnes for transmittal to your office, and a copy of the memorandum which we left with Mr. Byrnes. You had previously seen both of these documents and they are merely transmitted for your files.

Enclosed also is the text of a petition which was signed by 67 scientists working in this laboratory. It may not have crossed your desk since it had been transmitted in July via the War Department. Some of those who signed this petition have asked me that its text be made public; and I wondered whether you would be good enough to let me know by August 24 if you considered its publication undesirable.



Very sincerely yours,

Leothi Land

Lee Deillard

112 Mercer Street
Princeton, New Jersey
March 25, 1945

The Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt
The President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.



Sir:

I am writing you to introduce Dr. E. Schilder who proposes to submit to you certain considerations and recommendations. Unusual circumstances which I shall describe further below induce us to take this action in spite of the fact that I do not know the substance of the considerations and recommendations which Dr. Schilder proposes to submit to you.

In the summer of 1939 Dr. Schilder put before me his views concerning the potential importance of uranium for national defense. He was greatly disturbed by the potentialities involved and anxious that the United States Government be advised of them as soon as possible. Dr. Schilder, who is one of the discoverers of the neutron fission of uranium on which all present work on uranium is based, described to me a specific system which he devised and which he thought would make it possible to set up a chain reaction in un-separated uranium in the immediate future. Having known him for over twenty years both from his scientific work and personally, I have much confidence in his judgment and it was on the basis of his judgment as well as my own that I took the liberty to approach you in connection with this subject. You responded to my letter dated August 2, 1939 by the appointment of a committee under the chairmanship of Dr. Briggs and this started the Government's activity in this field.

The terms of secrecy under which Dr. Schilder is working at present do not permit him to give me information about his work; however, I understand that he now is greatly concerned about the lack of adequate contact between scientists who are doing this work and those members of your Cabinet who are responsible for formulating policy. In the circumstances I consider it my duty to give Dr. Schilder this introduction and I wish to express the hope that you will be able to give his presentation of the case your personal attention.

Very truly yours,

A. H. Smith.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAIL DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

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September 11, 1945.



Hornin
FBI WASH

Dear Mr. President:

I am sending you today my reservation about our relations with Russia in respect to the atomic bomb. I am not unaffected by the fact that when in Potsdam I talked with you about the question whether we could be safe in sharing the atomic bomb with Russia while she was still a police state and before she put into effect provisions assuring personal rights of liberty to the individual citizen.

I still recognize the difficulty and the still continued¹ of the importance of the ultimate importance of a change in Russia toward individual liberty but I have come to the conclusion that it would not be possible to use our possession of the atomic bomb as a direct lever to produce the change. I have become convinced that any demand by us for an internal change in Russia as a condition of sharing in the atomic weapon would be so resented that it would make the objective as here in view less probable.

I believe that the change in attitude toward the individual in Russia will come slowly and gradually and I am satisfied that we should not delay our approach to Russia in the matter of the atomic bomb until that process has been completed. My reasons

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MARY E. TURNER
Papers of Mary E. Turner
President's Secretary, a film

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are set forth in the memorandum I am handing you today. Furthermore, I believe that this long process of change in Russia is more likely to be expedited by the closer relationship to the nation of the atomic bomb which I suggest and the trust and confidence that I believe would be inspired by the method of approach which I have outlined.

Faithfully yours,


Harry S. Truman

Secretary of State

the President

The White House.

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TOP SECRET
U.S. GOVERNMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON



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11 September 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Proposed Action for Control of Atomic Bombs

The advent of the atomic bomb has stimulated great military and probably even greater political interest throughout the civilized world. In a world atmosphere already extremely sensitive to power, the introduction of this weapon has profoundly affected political considerations in all sections of the globe.

In many quarters it has been interpreted as a substantial offset to the growth of Soviet influence on the continent. We can be certain that the Soviet government has sensed this tendency and the temptation will be strong for the Soviet political and military leaders to acquire this weapon in the shortest possible time. Britain in effect already has the status of a partner with us in the development of this weapon. Accordingly, unless the Soviets are voluntarily invited into the partnership upon a basis of cooperation and trust, we are going to maintain the Anglo-American bloc ever against the Soviet in the possession of this weapon. Such a condition will almost certainly stimulate terrorist activity on the part of the Soviet toward the development of this bomb in what will in effect be a secret peasant zone of a rather desperate character. There is evidence to indicate that such activity may have already commenced.

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President's Secretary's Office

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DR. R. K. SINGH
DR. R. K. SINGH AND DR. R. K. SINGH
DR. R. K. SINGH AND DR. R. K. SINGH



If we feel, as I presume we must, that civilisation demands that some day we shall arrive at a satisfactory international arrangement respecting the control of this new force, the question then is how long we can afford to enjoy our temporary superiority in the hope of achieving our immediate peace without objecting.

Whether Russia gets control of the necessary secrets of protection in a radius of say four years or a radius of twenty years is not nearly as important to the world and civilization as to make sure that when they do get it they are willing and cooperative partners among the peace loving nations of the world. It is true that if we approach them now, as I would propose, we may be gambling on their good faith and risk their getting into protection of books a little sooner than they would otherwise.

To put the matter concisely, I consider the problem of our anti-fascist relations with Russia as not easily extricated with but as virtually dominated by the problem of the atomic bomb. Except for the problem of the control of that bomb, these relations, while vitally important, might not be immediately pressing. The establishment of relations of mutual confidence between her and us could afford to assist the slow progress of time. But with the discovery of the bomb, they become immediately urgent. Those relations may be perhaps irretrievably shattered by the way in which we approach the solution of the bomb with Russia. For if we fail to approach them

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our final merely positions to negotiate with them, leaving this weapon either ostentatiously or one hip, their cynicism and their distrust of our purposes and motives will increase. It will inspire them to greater efforts in an all out effort to solve the problem. If the solution is achieved in that spirit, it is much less likely that we will ever get the kind of agreement we may desperately need in the future. This risk is, I believe, greater than the other, because as our objective must be to get the best kind of international bargain we can — one that has some chance of being kept and serving civilization not for five or for twenty years, but forever.

The chief lesson I have learned in a long life is that the only way you can make a man trustworthy is to trust him and the easiest way to make him untrustworthy is to distrust him and show your distrust.

If the atomic bomb were merely another though more devastating military weapon to be assimilated into our pattern of international relations, it would be one thing. We could then follow the old custom of secrecy and nationalism military superiority relying on international covenants to prescribe the future use of the weapon as we did with gas. But I think the bomb instead constitutes merely a first step in a new control by man over the forces of nature too revolutionary and dangerous to fit into the old concepts. I think it really says the climax of the race between man's growing technical

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1920-1921
1921-1922
1922-1923



power for destructiveness and his psychological power of self-control and group control — his moral power. If so, our method of approach to the Tunisian is a question of the most vital importance in the evolution of human progress.

Since the core of the problem is Russia, any contemplated action leading to the control of this weapon should be primarily directed to Russia. It is my judgment that the Soviet would be most apt to respond sincerely to a direct and forthright approach made by the United States on this subject than could be the case if the approach were made as a part of a general international scheme, or if the approach were made after a succession of separate or implied threats in our peace negotiations.

My idea of an approach to the Soviets could be a direct proposal after discussions with the British that we could be prepared in effect to enter an arrangement with the Russians, the general purpose of which could be to control and limit the use of the atomic bomb as an instrument of war and as far as possible to direct and encourage the development of atomic power for peaceful and humanitarian purposes. Such an approach might more specifically lead to the proposal that we could stop work on the further improvement in, or manufacture of, the bomb as a military weapon, provided the Russians and the British could agree to do likewise. It might also provide that we could be willing to impose that books we can

APPENDIX B. UNITED STATES



here in the United States provided the Russians and the British would agree with us that in no event will they or we use a bomb as an instrument of war unless all three Governments agree to that use. We might also consider including in the arrangement a covenant with the U. S. and the Soviets providing for the exchange of benefits of future developments whereby atomic energy may be applied on a mutually satisfactory basis for commercial or humanitarian purposes.

I would take such an approach just as soon as our immediate political considerations make it appropriate.

I emphasize perhaps beyond all other considerations the importance of taking this action with Russia as a proposal of the United States - backed by Great Britain - but primarily the proposal of the United States. Action of any international group of nations, including any small nations who have not demonstrated their potential power or responsibility in this war could not, in my opinion, be taken seriously by the Soviets. The lesser threats which could surround such proposal, if put before a conference of nations, would provide but scant deterrence from the Soviet. As I say, I think this is the most important point in the program.

After the actions which have won this war have agreed to it, there will be ample time to introduce France and China into the covenants and finally to incorporate the agreement into the actions of the United Nations. The use of this term has been accepted by

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the world as the result of the initiative and productive capacity
of the United States, and I think this factor is a most potent
lever toward having our proposals accepted by the Soviets, whereas
I am most sceptical of obtaining any tangible results by way of any
international debate. I urge this method as the most realistic
means of accomplishing this vitally important step in the history
of the world.

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.



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- 6 -

HENRY L. STIMPSON LIBRARY
Report of Henry L. Stimson
President's Secretary's Office

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
REPORT ON THE PACIFIC

29 June 1946

My Dear Mr President:

Within the next fortnight the Survey will submit to you a summary report on the study of air power in the Pacific war requested by your letter of 13 August 1945.

The Survey is submitting herewith a separate and more detailed report on the effects of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the next few days this will be followed by a separate report on the events which led to the Japanese surrender.

The report on the atomic bombings has been coordinated with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy and approved by them in all respects. It has also been cleared by the Manhattan District for security.

In view of these clearances with respect to policies and security, it is suggested that should the report meet with your approval it would be appropriate for your release to the public in accordance with the views you expressed in our last conversation.

Respectfully submitted

Franklin D. Miller

Franklin D. Miller
Chairman

The President
The White House
Washington D C

the war continued many more weeks, whether continued by the western or agreed by the over-tired ruler change no course in the country.

It is apparent that the effect of the atomic bombing on the confidence of the Japanese civilian population was remarkably localized. Outside of the target cities, it had subordinate to other demoralizing experience. The effect which it did have was probably due largely to the number of casualties and the nature of the injuries received. These consequences were in part the result of surprise and the vulnerability of the raid defense system. Properly enforced morale, precautions, and an emergency war organization of the scale of the bomb's effects might have reduced casualties and, therefore, the effects on morale.

Even in the target cities, it must be emphasized, the atomic bombs did not uniformly destroy the Japanese fighting spirit. Hiroshima and Nagasaki, when compared with other Japanese cities, were not more devastated than the average. The bombs were tremendous personal catastrophes to the survivors, but neither time nor understanding of the evolutionary threat of the atomic bomb permitted them to see in these personal catastrophes a final blow to Japan's prospects for victory or negotiated peace.

3. The Japanese leaders in September.

The further question of the effects of the bombs on the morale of the Japanese leaders and their decision to abandon the war is tied up with other factors. The atomic bomb had more effect on the thinking of government leaders than on the morale of the rank and file of civilians outside of the target areas. It cannot be said, however, that the atomic bomb convinced the leaders who effected the peace of the necessity of surrender. The decision to seek ways and means to terminate the war, influenced in part by knowledge of the low state of popular morale, had been taken in May, 1945 by the Supreme War Guidance Council.

As early as the spring of 1942 a group of former prime ministers and others close to the Emperor had been making efforts toward bringing the war to an end. This group, including such men as Admiral Okada, Admiral Itoh, Prince Konoye, and Marquis Saito, had been influential in affecting Tojo's resignation and in making Admiral Suzuki Prime Minister after Tojo's fall. Even in the Suzuki Cabinet, however, agreement was far from unanimous. The Navy Minister, Admiral Togo, was sympathetic, but the War Minister, General Anami, usually represented the fight-to-the-end policy of the Army. In the Supreme War Guidance Council, a party of inner cabinet, his adherence to that line was further altered by the participation of the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff, so that on the peace issue this organization was evenly divided, with those three opposing the Prime



Minister, Foreign Minister, and Navy Minister. At any time military (especially Army) dissatisfaction with the Cabinet might have contributed at least to its fall and possibly in the "liquidation" of the anti-war members.

Thus the problem facing the peace leaders in the government was to bring about a surrender despite the insistence of the War Minister and the opposition of the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff. This had to be done, moreover, without precipitating counter measures by the Army which would eliminate the entire peace group. This was done ultimately by bringing the Emperor actively into the decision to accept the Potsdam terms. So long as the Emperor openly supported such a policy and could be presented to the country as doing so, the military, which had fostered and lived on the idea of complete obedience to the Emperor, could not effectively rebel.

A preliminary step in this direction had been taken at the Imperial Conference on 26 June. At this meeting, the Emperor, taking an active part despite his status to the contrary, stated that he desired the development of a plan to end the war as well as one to defend the home islands. This was followed by a reversal of earlier efforts to get the Soviet Union to intervene with the United States, which were effectively answered by the Potsdam Declaration on 26 July and the Russia's declaration of war on 9 August.

The atomic bombing considerably speeded up these political maneuverings within the government. This in itself was partly a morale effort, since there is ample evidence that members of the Cabinet were worried by the prospect of further atomic bombings, especially as the residue of Tokyo. The bombs did not convince the military that defense of the home islands was impossible, if their behavior in government councils is adequate testimony. It did permit the Government to say, however, that an army without the weapons could possibly resist an enemy who had it, thus serving "face" for the Army leaders and not reflecting on the competence of Japanese industrialists or the valor of the Japanese soldier. In the Supreme War Guidance Council voting remained divided, with the War Minister and the War Chief of Staff unwilling to accept unconditional surrender. There was little doubt, however, that the thinking of Hiranaka and Nagasaki reflected their inclination to oppose the peace group.

The peace effort culminated in an Imperial conference held at the night of 9 August and continued into the early hours of 10 August, for which the stage was set by the atomic bomb and the Russia's war declaration. At this meeting the Emperor, again breaking his customary silence, stated specifically that he wanted acceptance of the Potsdam terms.

A quip was current in high government circles at this time that the atomic bomb was the real earthquake, since it saved Japan from

December 14, 1945

My dear Doctor Compton:

I appreciated very much your sending me the article from The Atlantic Monthly - If The Atomic Bomb Had Not Been Used. It is the fairest sensible statement I have seen on the subject.

I have also asked the former Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, to assemble the facts and get them into more or less form, and, I think, he is doing that.

Your statement in The Atlantic Monthly is a fair analysis of the situation except that the final decision had to be made by the President, and was made after a complete survey of the whole situation had been made. The conclusions reached were substantially those put out in your article.

The Japanese were given fair warning and were offered the terms which they finally accepted, well in advance of the dropping of the bomb. I imagine the bomb caused them to accept the terms.

Sincerely yours,

MARY E. THOMAS

Dr. Karl T. Compton
President
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge 39, Massachusetts





IF THE ATOMIC BOMB HAD NOT BEEN USED

by KARL T. COMPTON

After a week after V-J Day I was one of a small group of scientists and engineers interviewing an intelligent, well-educated Japanese Army officer in Yokohama. We asked him what, in his opinion would have been the next major move of the war had continued. He replied: "You would probably have tried to invade our homeland with a landing operation in Kyushu about November 1. I think the attack would have been made as much as such bases."

"Could you have repelled an invasion?" we asked, and he answered: "It would have been a very desperate fight, but I do not think we could have stopped you."

"What would have happened then?" we asked.

He replied: "We would have kept on fighting until all Japanese were killed, but we would not have been defeated," by which he meant that they would not have been disengaged by surrender.

It is very clear after the event, to look back and realize that Japan was already a beaten nation, and to see what therefore was the justification for the use of the atomic bomb to kill so many thousands of helpless Japanese in this Japanese way. Furthermore, should we not better have kept it in reserve as a deterrent weapon for future use, if necessary? This argument has been advanced often, but it seems to me utterly fallacious.

I had, perhaps, an unusual opportunity to know the pertinent facts from several angles, yet I was without responsibility for any of the decisions. I can therefore speak without doing so dishonestly. While my role in the atomic bomb development was a very minor one, I was a member of the group called together by Secretary of War Stimson to advise him to plan for its use, use, and subsequent handling. Then, shortly before Hiroshima, I became attached to General MacArthur in Manila, and lived for two months with his staff. It thus may

A physicist and the first of three Americans to become a member of the National Academy of Sciences, Dr. Karl T. Compton has been the head of Massachusetts Institute of Technology since 1930. During the 1930s he served as a member of the Executive Committee of the National Research Council, Chairman of the National Defense Research Commission, Chairman of the Office of Production of the War Department, and an observer on General MacArthur's staff shortly after the Fall of

I learned something of the invasion plans and of the atomic activities of those best-informed officials that a desperate and nearly struggle was still ahead. Finally, I spent the five months after V-J Day in Japan, where I could witness at first hand both the physical and the psychological state of that country. Some of the documents which I compiled were very sensitive and passed through a long screening.

From this background I believe, with complete conviction, that the use of the atomic bomb saved hundreds of thousands — perhaps several millions — of lives, both American and Japanese, that without its use the war would have continued for many months, that the use of good conscience leaving, in Secretary Stimson and the Chiefs of Staff, did what was probably greatest and what the world forever might remember could have made any different decision. Let some of the facts speak for themselves.

For the use of the atomic bomb elsewhere? All war is hellish. There are more comparisons of the atomic bombing with conventional bombing. At Hiroshima the atomic bomb killed about 80,000 people, pulverized about 100 square miles, and leveled an additional ten square miles of the city, with devastating damage out in excess of eight miles from the center. At Nagasaki the total casualties were 40,000 and the area leveled was considerably smaller than at Hiroshima because of the configuration of the city.

Compare this with the results of two B-29 bombardies made over Tokyo. One of these raids killed about 100,000 people, the other nearly 100,000.

Of the 100 square miles of greater Tokyo, 80 square miles of the denser part was destroyed completely, for all practical purposes, in were the centers of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. About half the buildings were destroyed in the remaining 20 square miles, the number of people driven homeless out of Tokyo was considerably larger than the population of greater Chicago. These figures are based on information given out in Tokyo and on a detailed study of the air raids made on Tokyo. They may be somewhat, as ever but are certainly, of the right order of magnitude.

Was Japan already beaten before the atomic bomb? The answer is certainly "yes" in the sense that the forces of war had turned against her. The answer is "no" in the sense that she was still fighting desperately and there was every reason to believe that she would continue to do so, and this is the only sense that has any practical importance.

General MacArthur's staff anticipated about 30,000 American casualties and several thousand Japanese casualties in the November 1 operation to establish the initial beachheads on Kyushu. Also they expected a far more costly struggle before the Japanese homeland was reached. There was every reason to think that the Japanese would defend their homeland with even greater ferocity than when they fought to the death on Iwo Jima and Okinawa. No American soldier who survived the bloody struggle on those islands has much sympathy with the view that battle with the Japanese was over when it was clear that their ultimate situation was hopeless. No, there was every reason to expect a terrible struggle long after the point at which more people can now look back and say, "Japan was already beaten."

A month after our occupation I heard General MacArthur say that even then, if the Japanese government had wanted over its people and the millions of former Japanese subjects took to guerrilla action in the meantime, it could take a million American troops ten years to master the situation.

That this was not an exaggeration is shown by the following fact, which I have not now reported. We recall the long period of nearly three weeks between the Japanese offer to surrender and the actual surrender on September 2. That was needed in order to arrange details of the surrender and capitulation and to permit the Japanese government to prepare its people to accept the capitulation. It is not generally realized that there was threat of a revolt against the government, led by an Army general supported by the peasants, to whom we had given and maintained the war. For several days it was touch and go as to whether the people would follow their government or surrender.

The bulk of the Japanese people did not consider themselves beaten, in fact they believed they were winning in spite of the terrible punishment they had taken. They watched the paper balloons sail off and float upward in the wind, confident that these were carrying a terrible retaliation to the United States in revenge for our air raids.

We gained a vivid insight into the state of knowledge and morale of the ordinary Japanese soldier from a young private who had served through the war in the Japanese Army. He had first been hospitalized in America, and had graduated in 1940 from Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This boy, thoroughly American in outlook, had gone with his family to visit relatives shortly after his graduation. They were caught in the explosions and he was drafted into the Army.

This young Japanese told us that all his fellow soldiers believed that Japan was winning the war. To them the losses of Iwo Jima and Okinawa were parts of a grand strategy to force the American forces closer and closer to the mainland, until they could be pinched upon and utterly annihilated. He himself had come to have some doubts as a result of various Japanese claims in official reports. Also he had seen the Potsdam assembly lose an opportunity and hence that Japan could not match America in war production. But none of the soldiers had any inkling of the true situation until war's end, at that very last, but urgent, was called to face the reality of the surrender proclamation.

Did the atomic bomb bring about the end of the war? That is would do so was the unstated gamble and hope of Mr. Truman, General MacArthur, and their associates. The facts are these. On July 26, 1945, the Potsdam Ultimatum called on Japan to surrender unconditionally. On July 29 Potsdam should have issued a statement, reportedly at 1:00 noon press conference, stating its awareness of a third nation, the surrenderees' situation, and sympathizing the increasing rate of Japanese aircraft production. Eight days later, on August 6, the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima; the second was dropped on Nagasaki, on the following day, August 9. Japan declared its intention to surrender, and on August 14 accepted the Potsdam terms.

On the basis of these facts, I cannot believe that, without the atomic bomb, the surrenderees would have done without a great deal more of sympathetic and timely.

Exactly what role the atomic bomb played will always allow many ways for conjecture. A survey has shown that it did not have much immediate effect on the average people far from the two bombed cities; they knew little or nothing of it. The even more disastrous incendiary bombing of Tokyo and other cities had not brought the people into the blood of surrender.

The evidence points to 1. mobilization of forces. (1) Some of the more informed and intelligent elements in Japanese official circles realized that they were fighting a losing battle and that sooner or later they must give up the war. These elements, however, were not powerful enough to sway the situation against the dominating Army expansionists, backed by the proliferating industrialists, the peasants, and the ignorant masses. (2) The atomic bomb overthrew a dramatic new element into the situation, which strengthened the hands of those who sought peace and provided a convincing argument for those who had hitherto advocated unceasing war. (3) When the second atomic bomb was dropped, it became clear that the war was not an isolated weapon, but that there were others to follow. With a clear prospect of a barrage of these terrible bombs and no possibility of preventing them, the argument for surrender was made conclusive.

wining. Thus I believe to be the true picture of the effect of the atomic bomb in bringing the war to a sudden end, with Japan's unconditional surrender:

If the atomic bomb had not been used, we know like that I have cited, prior to the practical certainty that there would have been many more months of death and destruction on our northern roofs. Also the early closing of Okinawa was fortunate for a reason which could not have been anticipated. If the invasion plan had proceeded as scheduled, Okinawa, too, would have seen Okinawa covered with amphibious and air harbors crowded with landing craft poised for the attack. The typhoon which struck Okinawa in that month would have wrecked the invasion plan with a military disaster comparable to Pearl Harbor.

These are some of the facts which lead those who knew them, and especially those who had to have opinions on them, to feel that there is much evidence and wisdom thinking among them after-

the-event strategists who now deplore the use of the atomic bomb on the ground that it was unnecessary or that it was unnecessary because Japan was already beaten. And it was not one atomic bomb, or two, which brought surrender; it was the suggestion of what an atomic bomb will actually do to a community, plus the dread of many more that was effective.

If 200 bombers could wreak such destruction on Tokyo, what will 200 bombers, each carrying an atomic bomb, do to the City of Tomorrow? It is that deadly prospect which over looks such love to the two basic policies of our nation on this subject (1) We must strive gallantly and with all our ability to promote the United Nations effort to insure future peace between nations, but we must not lightly consider the atomic bomb as a weapon for our own defense. (2) We should surrender or share it only when there is adopted an international plan to enforce peace to which we can have great confidence.

NUREMBERG IN RETROSPECT

by CHARLES E. WYZANSKI, JR.

I

In the April *Atlantic Monthly* I raised doubts as to certain aspects of the then uncompleted Nuremberg trial. Since that time I have had a chance to profit from comments of Mr. Justice Jackson, Professor Sheldon Gluck, Professor Max Radin, Professor Leo Tolier, an anonymous contributor to the July 1947, *Law Quarterly Review*, and others; I have also read reports of the trial and have studied a summary of the judgment. This further investigation has led me to resolve most of my earlier doubts, and I hope that if I state my own change of view I may contribute to the clearing of others who are concerned about the great questions raised by this trial.

The doubt which caused me to criticize the Nuremberg trial most fundamentally was whether the defendants could properly be held to answer a charge that they had engaged in "the crime of aggressive war." Was there any such substantive offense?

Many who replied affirmatively maintained that "the crime of aggressive war" was no different from

the specific war crimes (such as killing a captured quarry civilian) that had been defined in the Hague Convention of 1897. That is, they argued that waging an aggressive war was a crime that had been outlawed by a specific treaty or treatise, and that individuals who engaged in such conduct were individuals who engaged in the conduct of captured civilians tried by any tribunal established for the violation by a warring power, and were punishable by any power so authorized for the moment by that power.

This argument seems to me incorrect. It does not seem to me that an examination of the present case, its numerous preprints, diplomatic correspondence, and juristic writings shows that there was a specific international agreement that individuals who waged an aggressive war were criminals in the same sense that there was a specific international convention that individuals who killed captured civilians were criminals.

But it is not sufficient to stop with that purely analytical approach. There remains the question: Is it just to sentence, if guilty, plotters of an aggressive war?

Those who believed that, first, they planned that war best,

In the Atlantic for last April Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., Judge of the U.S. District Court for Massachusetts, expressed his doubts about the validity of the Nuremberg trial, as threatened by its critics. Here he has been cleared away by reason as he brought out in his correspondence.

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Papers of Harry S. Truman
President's Secretary's Files

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON D. C.

December 23, 1952

MEMORANDUM TO: GENERAL LAMBERT

Attached is a letter from Professor Gates of the University of Chicago asking clarification of the precise circumstances under which the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima.

If this letter is to be answered, it may take some research in official files and discussion with the President. Since this is an Air Force project, perhaps it would be more appropriate if you checked into this thing.

If, when the information is available, you wish us to write a reply, we will be glad to do so.

John
JOHN F. KENNEDY

Attachment

THE WHITE HOUSE

Washington

30 December 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President, it would be very desirable, if you could do it, to let this historian have such information as could be used in the history that he is writing concerning the circumstances under which the first atomic bombs were dropped.


B. B. Farley
Major General, USAF

Enc.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

1050 DRAKE WITH STREET

December 4, 1953

The President
Washington, D. C.



Sirs:

For several years it has been my privilege to serve as one of the editors and authors of The Army Air Forces in World War II, a history published on a non-profit basis under the joint sponsorship of the U. S. Air Force and the University of Chicago. One of my tasks for the fifth volume, now in press, was to write an account of the atomic bomb attacks against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In respect to the decision to use the bomb I have been faced with an apparent discrepancy in the evidence which I have been unable to resolve, and, in spite of a reluctance to impose upon the time of the President, I am turning to you for information, for which you are the best and perhaps the sole authority.

I have read with great interest your own statements - that released on 6 August 1945 and that contained in your letter to Mr. Earl F. Gom�on, dated 18 December 1946 and published in the Athens Monthly of February 1947. I have read also the late Mr. Gilman's more detailed account in Harper's Magazine of February 1947 which is in perfect accord with yours - the first being that the broad decision for which you courageously assumed responsibility was made at Potsdam "in the face of" Franklin Roosevelt's rejection of the warning contained in the Potsdam Declaration of 16 July, and that the active aim is to avoid the great loss of life that would have attended the invasion of Kyushu scheduled for November.

More recently I have seen a photostatic copy of the directive to Gen. Carl Spaatz ordering him to deliver the first atomic bomb against one of four designated targets; the document has been declassified and I am enclosing a true copy. The letter is dated at Washington on 25 July 1945 and bears the signature of Gen. Thomas T. Handy, Acting Chief of Staff during General Marshall's absence at Potsdam. According to General Arnold's statement elsewhere (L. B. Arnold, Global Mission (New York, 1949), p. 287), this directive was based on a memorandum dispatched by directive to Washington after a conference on 22 July between himself, Secretary Stimson, and General Marshall.

The directive contains an unqualified order to launch the attack "as soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 August 1945."

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President's Secretary's Files

the President

- 2 -

December 6, 1952

There is no reference to the Potsdam Declaration which was to be issued on the next day and no statement as to what should be done in the event of a Japanese offer to surrender before 3 August. It is possible that the written directive was qualified by oral instructions, or that it was intended that it be countermanded by a radio message if the Japanese did accept the Potsdam terms, or that the directive was an erroneous representation of Secretary Stimson's real intentions. Nevertheless, as it stands the directive seems to indicate that the decision to use the bomb had been made at least one day before the promulgation of the Potsdam Declaration and two days before Suzuki's rejection thereof on 28 July, Tokyo time. Such an interpretation is in flat contradiction to the explanatory language in the published statements, that the final decision was made only after the Japanese refusal of the ultimatum.

Because of the extraordinary importance of this problem, I am appealing to you for more complete information as to the time and the circumstances under which you arrived at the final decision, and for permission to quote your reply in the volume of which I have spoken. Your well-known interest in history has encouraged me to seek my information at the source, as the historian should, without apology other than for having intruded on your crowded schedule with a letter made nearly last by my desire to state the problem accurately.

Very truly yours,

James L. Gates

James L. Gates
Professor of Medieval History

JLG:js
Enclosure

O
P
T

ARMED FORCES
DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
Washington 25, D. C.

25 July 1945

To: General Carl Spaatz
Commanding General
United States Army Strategic Air Forces

1. The 509 Composite Group, 509th Air Force will deliver its first special bomb as soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 August 1945 on one of the targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Mifigata and Nagasaki. To carry military and civilian scientific personnel from the War Department to observe and record the effects of the explosion of the bomb, additional aircraft will accompany the airplane carrying the bomb. The observing planes will stay several miles distant from the point of impact of the bomb.
2. Additional bombs will be delivered on the above targets as soon as made ready by the project staff. Further instructions will be issued concerning targets other than those listed above.
3. Dissemination of any and all information concerning the use of the weapon against Japan is reserved to the Secretary of War and the President of the United States. No communiques on the subject or releases of information will be issued by Commanders in the field without specific prior authority. Any news stories will be sent to the War Department for special clearance.
4. The foregoing direction is issued to you by direction and with the approval of the Secretary of War and of the Chief of Staff, USA. It is desired that you personally deliver one copy of this directive to General MacArthur and one copy to General Shantz for their information.



A.M.

Gen. T. Henry
Gen. T. Shantz
General, G.H.C.
Acting Chief of Staff

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dec. 31, 1952

My dear Professor Cate:-

Your letter of Dec 6th 1952 has just now been delivered to me. When the message came to London that a successful atomic explosion had taken place in New Mexico, there was much excitement and speculation about the effect on the war that is progress with Japan.

The next day, Mr. Holt Price Minister of War [and] British Minister of Supply and War Materiel stated that the explosion had been a success. The British Prime Minister understood and appreciated what I'd told him. Prime Minister Stalin waited and thanked me.

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Report of Harry S. Truman
President's Secretary's File

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

for reporting the explosion to him but I'm sure he did not understand its significance.

I called a meeting of the Sec. of State, the Agrees, the Sec. of War, Mr. Stimson, Adm. Leahy, Gen. Marshall, Gen. MacArthur, the Sec. of the Navy, Adm. King and some others to discuss what should be done with the airmen.

I asked Gen. Marshall what it would cost in lives to land on the Tokyo plane and other planes in Japan [It was his opinion that 4 million casualties would be the minimum cost as well as an equal number of the enemy.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

the other military and naval
area present agreed.

I asked Dr. Stilinov which
cities in Japan were devoted
exclusively to war production.
He promptly named Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, ... ,

We sat as ult. contractors
Japan. It was ignored.

Forde's atomic bomb dropped
on the two cities named on
the back from Potofka she
are still in the middle of the
Atlast. Area, ... ,

Dropping the bomb ended
the war, saved lives and gave

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WASHINGTON

the free nations a chance
to face the fact.

Then it looked as if Japan
would quit, Russia hurried
into the fray [unclear] before the
Soviets do so as to be in at
the settlement. No military
contribution was made by
the Russians toward victory
over Japan. Prisoners were
surrounded and Manchuria
occupied as was Korea south
of the 38th parallel.

Russia in Asia has been
a great liability since]

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 2, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LUCEY:

There are two points in the President's draft which should be changed. On page 3, it is stated: "I asked Gen. Marshall what it would cost in lives to land on the Tokyo plain and other places in Japan. It was his opinion that 3 million casualties would be the minimum cost as well as an equal number of the enemy." Stimson says in his book On Acting (Harper, p. 619): "We estimated that if we should be forced to carry this plan to its conclusion, the major fighting would not end until the latter part of 1946, at the earliest. I was informed that such operations might be expected to cost over 3 million casualties, to American forces alone." I think it is important that the President's casualty figure be changed to conform with that of Secretary Stimson, because presumably Stimson got his from Gen. Marshall; the size of the figure is very important.

On page 4, it is stated: "Then it looked as if Japan would quit, Russia hurried into the fray nine days before the surrender so as to be in at the settlement." Actually, Russia announced her decision to enter the Japanese War on August 8, effective August 9; the surrender of Japan was tendered on August 14. Therefore, the statement should be changed to read "Five days before the surrender" or "Nine days before the surrender."

In his letter to the President, Professor Gates calls attention to the directive of July 25, 1945 from Gen. Handy to Gen. Spaatz, containing an unqualified order to launch the atomic bomb attack. Professor Gates asks whether this directive does not contradict published statements that the final decision was made only after the Japanese refusal of the ultimatum.

According to Dr. Joseph Wreszinski, Historian of the Office of Secretary of Defense, it is clear that the Gen. Handy order could have been countermanded if the event Japan had responded to the Potsdam Ultimatum — just as any military order can be countermanded. The fundamental decision to use the bomb preceded the Gen. Handy letter, and the decision to "trigger" its use and define the targets was made by the President as indicated in his memorandum. I do not feel this needs elaboration.



K. W. T.
KAREN W. TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 5, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LESTER

Dr. Fieseker called regarding the dropping of the atomic bombs, and said that all his records show are that General Groves reported on the effectiveness of the bomb test in New Mexico, reporting on July 21, and Secretary Stimson and others at Potsdam conferred daily with the President on July 22, July 23, and July 24. Presumably Secretary of the Navy Forrestal was not present at the conference to which the President refers (although he did not arrive at Potsdam until July 26 at 5:00 P. M.). The only other information which Dr. Fieseker has is that the operation, initially scheduled for August 3, was postponed on two occasions (presumably due to weather).

Dr. Fieseker says that Admiral Roscoe has all of the Potsdam papers, which Fieseker believes it will be necessary for us to look at in order to get a conclusive answer to the questions raised by the President's note.

Robert Barrows says that the President left Washington for Potsdam on July 6 at 11:00 P. M., arrived on July 15, departed on the return trip on August 2 at 6:00 P. M., and arrived in Washington, D. C., on August 3 at 10:50 P. M. The Potsdam Conference actually lasted during the days July 17 to August 2, 1945.



K. W. H.
KIRKET H. HAGLER

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President's Secretary's Files

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 5, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MILLER:

Supplementing my previous note on the conversation with Dr. Winzeler, Gordon Arnow of the Department of State (an adviser on atomic energy) states that the order from General Bundy to General Sparks was necessary because orders had to be cut in advance and the wheels had to be set in motion, even though the final decision on dropping the bomb was necessarily in the hands of the President.

Arnow does not have a full list of the participants in the meeting at Potomac, but he feels that Harvey Bundy, special Assistant to Secretary Alsop on atomic matters, was present. Winzeler feels that McCloy may have been present, but he has no way of knowing.

Arnow is sure that the President made the decision to drop the bomb at the last minute, on the way back from Potomac.

He has no information on the selection or elimination of targets at the Potomac meeting other than what Alsop says in his book about the elimination of Kyoto.

Bundy may have some information on this in writing to Arnow; Bundy is now with the law firm of Curtis, Hall, and Stewart in Boston.



K. Shultz
KENNETH W. SHULTZ

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 6, 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

At your request I have revised your draft letter to Professor Gao, and I have made a few slight revisions after checking the details.

In your draft, you state that General Marshall told you that a landing in Japan would cost a quarter of a million casualties to the United States, and an equal number of the enemy. Mr. Stimson, in his book written by McGeorge Bundy, says that Marshall's estimate was over a million casualties. Your recollection sounds more reasonable than Stimson's, but in order to avoid a conflict, I have changed the wording to read that General Marshall expected a minimum of a quarter of a million casualties and possibly a much greater number — as high as a million.

Secretary Forrestal does not appear to have been at the Petropavlovsk meetings until July 29, and your conference about the atom bomb appears to have taken place early in the meeting, on July 27, 28 and 29. Accordingly, I have deleted the Secretary of the Navy from the list of those with whom you conferred.

I have also inserted a paragraph explaining why the orders to General Spaatz were dated July 25 rather than after the ultimatum. This has been checked with the historians of the Department of Defense.

Russian entry into the war was less than a week before the surrender.

I have deleted the last sentence of your draft, since I think that it might be unfairly used by the propagandists of the political opposition. It states a fundamental truth, but in a very restrained way, and it seemed to me that it might raise more problems than it would help.

I attach various memoranda to us on this subject from Kenneth Heckler who did the research.



David D. Lloyd
DAVID D. LLOYD

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Page of Harry S. Truman
President's Secretary's File

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 12, 1953

My dear Professor Gates:

Your letter of December 6, 1952 has just now been delivered to me.

When the message came to Potsdam that a successful atomic explosion had taken place in New Mexico, there was much excitement and conversation about the effect on the talks in progress with Japan.

The next day I told the Prime Minister of Great Britain and Generalissimo Stalin that the explosion had been a success. The British Prime Minister understood and appreciated what I'd told him. Premier Stalin asked and thanked me for reporting the explosion to him, but I'm sure he did not understand its significance.

I called a meeting of the Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, the Secretary of War, Mr. Dulles, Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, General Eisenhower, General King and some others, to discuss what should be done with this useful weapon.

I asked General Marshall what it would cost in lives to land on the Tokio plain and other plains in Japan. It was his opinion that such an invasion would cost at a minimum one quarter of a million casualties, and might cost as much as a million, on the American side alone, with an equal number of the enemy. The other military and naval men present agreed.

I asked Secretary Byrnes which cities in Japan were devoted exclusively to war production. He promptly named Hiroshima and Nagasaki, among others.

We sent an ultimatum to Japan. It was rejected.

I ordered a atomic bomb dropped on the two cities cited in the ultimatum from Potsdam, when we were at the middle of the Atlantic Ocean.

In your letter, you raise the fact that the direction



to General Spears to prepare for delivering the book to dated July twenty-fifth. It was, of course, necessary to get the military wheels in motion, so these orders did, but the final decision was in my hands, and was not made until we were returning from Potsdam.

Dropping the book ended the war, saved lives, and gave the free nations a chance to face the facts.


When it looked as if Japan would quit, Russia hurried into the fray less than a week before the surrender, so as to be in at the settlement. No military contribution was made by the Russians toward victory over Japan. Prisoners were surrendered and territories occupied by the Soviets, so was Korea, north of the 38th parallel.

Honorary yours,

(Sgd) Harry S. Truman



Professor James L. Gates,
Department of History,
The University of Chicago,
1126 East 57th Street,
Chicago, Ill.
Illinois.





On April 25, 1945, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and an appointment with the President at the White House. Stimson later, in his book "On Active Service In Peace And War" writes:

"When Stimson went to the White House on April 25, 1945, to discuss the atomic bomb with a President from whom he knew the matter had been kept secret, he took with him a communiqué which dealt not so much with the military use of the bomb as with its long-range political meaning.²

In this book Stimson quoted the communiqué as follows:

"1. Within four months we shall in all probability have completed the most terrible weapon ever known in human history, one use of which could destroy a whole city.

"2. Although we have shared its development with the U.S.S.R., probably the U.S. is at present in the position of controlling the resources with which to construct and use it and no other nation could reach this position for some years.

"3. Nevertheless it is probably certain that we could not remain in this position indefinitely.

"4. Various aspects of its efficiency and production are widely known among our scientists in many countries, although few scientists are now acquainted with the basic process which we have developed.

"5. Although its construction under present methods requires great scientific and industrial effort and raw materials, which are temporarily easily within the possession and knowledge of U.S. and U.S.S.R., it is extremely probable that much easier and cheaper methods of production will be discovered by scientists in the full 20, together with the use of materials of much wider distribution. As a result, it is extremely probable that the future will make it possible to be constructed by smaller nations or even groups, or at least by a large nation in a much shorter time.

"6. As a result, it is indicated that the future may see a time when such a weapon may be manufactured in secret and used suddenly and effectively with devastating power by a willful nation or group against an unsuspecting nation or group of much greater size and material power. With its aid even a very powerful unsuspecting nation might be conquered within a very few days by a very much smaller one. . . .

"7. The world in its present state of moral advancement compared with its technical development would be arrested at the entry of such a weapon. In other words, entire civilization might be completely destroyed.

**. To approach any world peace organization of any pattern we
likely to be considered, without an agreement by the leaders of our country
of the power of this new weapon, would seem to be unrealistic. No system
of control hitherto considered would be adequate to control this weapon,
both inside our particular country and between the nations of the world, the
control of this weapon will undoubtedly be a matter of the greatest difficulty
and would involve such thorough-going rights of inspection and internal con-
trols as we have never heretofore contemplated.

**. Furthermore, in the light of our present position with reference
to this weapon, the question of sharing it with other nations and, if so
shared, upon what terms, becomes a primary question of our foreign relations.
Also our leadership in the way and in the development of this weapon had
placed a certain social responsibility upon us which we cannot shirk without
very serious responsibility for any disaster to civilization which it would
further.

**. On the other hand, if the problem of the proper use of this
weapon can be solved, we would have the opportunity to bring the world into
a pattern in which the peace of the world and our civilization can be saved.



In outlining the history of the development of the atomic bomb in his book, Stimson referred to a paper which he published in February, 1947, in Harper's Magazine and he quoted at length from that article.

He said that it was in the fall of 1939 that the question of atomic energy was first brought directly to his attention. At that time President Roosevelt appointed a committee consisting of the President's ^{Henry} Wallace, General Marshall, Dr. Vannevar Bush, President of the Carnegie Institute of Technology, Dr. James B. Conant, President of Harvard University and himself to advise the President on questions of policy relating to the study of nuclear fission which was then proceeding both in the United States and Great Britain. He said that from May 1, 1941, until his resignation as Secretary of War on September 26, 1945, he was directly responsible to the President for administration of the entire undertaking with General Marshall, Bush, Conant and Major General Leslie E. Groves, the Director-in-Charge of the project, as his chief adviser.

He said the policy adopted and steadily pursued by Roosevelt and his advisers was to spare no effort in securing the earliest possible successful development of an atomic weapon. The original experimental achievement of atomic fission, he pointed out, had occurred in Germany in 1938 and it was known that the Germans had conducted their experiments. In 1941 and 1942 they were believed to be ahead of us and it was vital that they should not be the first to bring atomic weapons into the field of battle.

All the time, from 1941 to 1947, Stimson wrote, "had I ever been informed by the President or by any other responsible member of the Government that atomic energy should not be used in the war?" He said the entire purpose of the project was production of a military weapon. On all other ground could the war-time expenditure of so much time and money have been justified?"

Stimson, in addition to general supervision of the work of General Groves, became Chairman of a combined policy committee, composed of British and American officials and responsible directly to the President, and Prime Minister Churchill.

Until 1944, Stimson said work on the \$100,000,000 secret funds selectively¹ available from other appropriations but no expenditure imposed it was decided that direct appropriation would be necessary. Therefore, in February, 1944, Stimson, Marshall and Bush took it up with Speaker Rayburn and Representatives McCormack and Martin, Democratic and Republican Leaders of the House, who piloted the necessary appropriation through the House without public discussion. A meeting in June with Senators Barkley, Walter, Bridges and Thomas of Oklahoma, brought similar results in the Senate. In 1945 additional large appropriations were likewise obtained.

Stimson said that at the start as it became clear that the weapon could not be available in time for use in an European war and that war was successfully ended without it. In the spring of 1945, however, it became evident that the climax of the effort was nearing but it was impossible to state with certainty that success had been achieved until a test had actually completed. A test was to be made at the Alamogordo Reservation in New Mexico.

On March 15, 1945, Stimson said he had his last talk with President Roosevelt. He said he took with him a memorandum which the President had sent him from an unnamed person who had been claimed as the source of extraneous to the Manhattan Project.² This was suggested that a body of outside scientists be formed to pass upon the project because there were rumors that Bush and Groves had "told the President a lie" on the subject and ought to be checked upon.³ He said, it was a rather jittery and nervous memorandum and rather silly but that he was prepared for it and gave the President a list of the scientists who were actually engaged on the project to show their high standing. The list he said comprised four Nobel prize men



and practically every physicist of standing. He said he then outlined the future of H-bomb and "told over with him the two schools of thought that exist in respect to the future control after the use of this project, in case it is successful, one of them being the secret alone-in attempt to control the project by those who control it now, and the other being the International control based upon freedom both of science and of access." He told him that these things must be settled before the first projectile is used and that he must be ready with a statement to come out with the people on it just as soon as that is done. He agreed to that."



He said the conversation covered the three aspects of this question then uppermost in their minds — first that it was always necessary to pay some staggering debt; that such a titanic undertaking could be successfully carried the implications of success in terms of a long-range nuclear effect; third the problem that would be presented at the time of the first use of the weapon, for with that first use he said there must be some public statement.

In April, Stimson set up a committee, charged with the functions of advising the President on the various questions raised by our apparently imminent forces in developing an atomic weapon.¹ The committee, known as the Manhattan Committee consisted of Stimson as Chairman, George L. Harrison who acted as Chairman in Stimson's absence; James F. Byrnes, then a private citizen, as personal representative of the President; Ralph A. Bard, Under Secretary of the Navy; William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State; Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of Scientific Research & Development, and President of the Carnegie Institute of Washington; Dr. Karl T. Compton, Chief of the Office of Scientific Research & Development, and President of Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and Dr. James B. Conant, Chairman of the National Defense Research Commission, and President of Harvard University.

The committee's work included the drafting of statements issued immediately after the first bombs were dropped, preparation of a bill for atomic control of atomic energy, and recommendations leading toward international control of atomic energy.

On June 1st, this committee recommended that the bomb be used against Japan, without specific warning, as soon as possible and against such a target as to make its devastating strength clear.

Wilson wrote that an advisory panel of the distinguished atomic physicists reported that they could propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war — "we see no acceptable alternative to direct military use."⁴ Wilson said that the evaluations of the committee were similar to his own although he reached his independently and he felt that to extract a genuine surrender from the Japanese Emperor and his military advisors there must be administered a tremendous shock which would carry convincing proof of our power to destroy the Empire. He felt such an effective shock "would never take the number of lives, both American and Japanese, that it would cost."⁵ He set forth an argument in support of his opinion which opinion he said was held not only by himself but by all his senior military advisors.

In July, 1945, although Japan had been seriously weakened, he said there was no indication of any weakening in the determination to fight rather than to accept unconditional surrender. Estimates of the War Department General Staff indicated that the Japanese Army had a total strength of about 11 million men and there was a very possibility that the Japanese Government might determine upon resistance to the end which would pose the Allies with the task of destroying an armed force of five million men and five hundred million women. Plans of the armed forces for the defeat of Japan had been prepared without reliance upon the atomic bomb. They included an intensified sea and air blockade; strategic air bombing through the summer and early fall to be



followed on November 1st by invasion of the northern island of Kyushu. This to be followed by an invasion of the main island of Honshu in the Spring of 1946. The total United States military and naval force of five million men would be involved. He said they estimated that if we should be forced to carry this plan to a conclusion with major fighting it would not end until the latter part of 1946 at the earliest. With these thoughts in mind he wrote a memorandum for the President on July 3rd. This was prepared after general discussion and agreement with Joseph C. Grew, Acting Secretary of State and Secretary of the Navy Forrestal. He said this was prompted not by the problem of atomic energy but by American desire to achieve a Japanese surrender without invading the home islands.

The memorandum was of considerable length and bore the title "Proposed Program for Japan" and did not mention the atomic bomb. It would propose a carefully-drawn warning to Japan before any invasion of the Empire was attempted. He said there was much discussion in Washington about the timing of this warning and that the controlling factor in the end was the date set for the Potsdam Conference. He said it was President Truman's decision that such a warning should be issued by the United States and the United Kingdom from this meeting, with the concurrence of the Head of the Chinese Government so that it would be plain that all Japan's enemies were united. This was done in the Potsdam ultimatum of July 26th. On July 28th, the Japanese Premier rejected the ultimatum.

The New Mexico test of the atomic bomb occurred on July 16th while the President was at Potsdam.

He said a list of suggested targets for the atom bomb was made up and he approved four, including the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The former was bombed on August 6th and the latter on August 9th.

- - - - -

Report prepared by Dean Acheson, White House
Assistant, on 1950-51

SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED
July 19, 1950
Dean A. Acheson

the same as you would in a combat division to go forward on the ground
and across the suspension and as you say when you go to win it was it taken
the first division the armored division and artillery on the ground no doubt
what sort of weapons you have It was the estimate of General Marshall
that this action would probably save the lives of 250,000 of our soldiers
and probably twice as many Americans - that was what I was trying to avoid

Hillman - what the professor is trying to get at is despite
the preceding from the air the ordinary bombs on Germany and Japan
wouldn't have the effect of a knock-out blow

Trotter - the atomic bomb was the knockout blow - the
guts of the armored division would have on the ground behind the enemy,

Payne - Mr. Truman in his book says he usage a psychological
blow which would perhaps be the means of making the Japanese give in
and he keeps nothing about that.

Trotter - that is all right and, of course, in the long run
it takes the psychological condition of the country's related to cause a
suspension but my objective was to use the atomic bomb possibly as a
political blow to create a military situation. That is the long run in
what happened In the first world war if you will remember the Germans
were not completely defeated - Germany was never invaded and never

touched except by a few air raids which we made along toward the
and but the fact that nine hundred thousand Americans had marched
up to _____ and were about to take over caused them to surrender.
They never would have surrendered otherwise. I don't believe in
speculating on the mental feeling and as far as the bomb is concerned
I ordered its use for a military reason - for no other cause and it saved
the lives of a great many of our soldiers. That is all I had in mind.

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COPY

CITY OF HIROSHIMA
HIROSHIMA, JAPAN

March 1, 1950

Mr. Harry S. Truman
Independence, Missouri
U. S. A.

Dear Mr. Truman.


Please find enclosed a copy of the English translation of the resolution made by the City Council of Hiroshima in connection with the statement you recently made concerning the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and on the hydrogen bomb.

The people of Hiroshima, who actually suffered the painful sting of the bomb, are naturally most keenly sensitive to the moral side of the nuclear weapons. It is our regret that your statement has urged us to make the resolution which we hereby forward you for your consideration.

Yours very truly,

/s/ Takeo Nitoguri

Chairman
Hiroshima City Council



RESOLUTION NO. 11

RESOLUTION TO DECLARE PROTEST AGAINST BROADCAST REMARKS OF MR. TRUMAN FORMER UNITED STATES PRESIDENT

The citizens of Hiroshima who have told their life, a translation of more than two hundred thousand lives taken to sacrifice because of their duty to be a cornerstone of world peace and held that no cities of the world should ever be permitted to repeat the error of using nuclear weapons on any people anywhere in the globe whatever be the reason.

If, however, the statement made by Mr. Truman, former President of the United States, that he felt no obligation whatsoever after directing the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and that hydrogen bombs would be put to use in future in case of emergency be true. It is a gross falsehood committed on the people of Hiroshima and their fallen victims.

We the City Council do hereby protest against it in deep indignation caused by our citizens and declare that in the name of humanity and peace we appeal to the wisdom of the United States and her citizens and to their mass voice for peace that said statement be retracted and they may fulfill their obligations for the cause of world peace.

Be it hereby resolved

February 13, 1954

Hiroshima City Council

Submitted February 13, 1954

By KAZUO MATSUBATA, Hiroshima City Councilman
TOSHIRO AMIMOTO
TOSHIYOSHI YOSHINAKA
KIYOTOMI TSUCHIKA
MEIICHI MATSUMURA

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The following letter was written March 12, 1958, by former President of the United States Harry S. Truman to His Excellency Miyagi, Chairman of the Hiroshima City Council, Hiroshima, Japan, in reply to the resolution passed by the Hiroshima City Council protesting Mr. Truman's recently televised comments on the dropping of the atomic bomb on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Your message letter concerning the resolution of the Hiroshima City Council, was highly appreciated. The feeling of the people of your city is easily understood and I am not in any way offended by the resolution which their city council passed.

However, it becomes necessary for me to remind the City Council, and perhaps you, that, at some historical events,

In 1941 while a peace conference was in progress in Washington between representatives of the Emperor of Japan and the Secretary of State of the United States, representing the President and the Government of the United States, a naval expedition of the Japanese Government approached the Hawaiian Islands, a territorial part of the United States, and bombed our Pearl Harbor Naval Base. It was done without provocation, without warning and without a declaration of war.

Thousands of young American sailors and civilians were murdered by this unprovoked and unheeded attack, which brought on the war between the people of Japan and the people of the United States. It was an unnecessary and terrible act.

The United States has always been a friend of Japan from the time our great Admiral suggested in opening the door to friendly relations between our two countries.

Our sympathies were with Japan in the war between Russia and Japan in the early 1900's. The President of the United States, Theodore Roosevelt, intervened and brought about a peace settlement.

But in the 1930's Japan joined the Axis Powers, and when the Hitler regime in Germany and Mussolini's government in Italy were defeated, Japan was left alone.

From October to 1941, before Russia declared war on Japan, Great Britain, China and the United States issued an ultimatum suggesting that Japan join the Germans and Italians in surrender. This document, sent to the Japanese Government through Sweden and Switzerland, received only a very short and discourteous reply.

Our military advisors had informed Prime Minister Churchill of Great Britain,

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Generalissimo Chuang Kuo-shick of China and the President of the United States that it would require at least a million and a half Allied soldiers to land in the Tokyo plain and on the main island of Japan.

On July 16, 1945, before the demand for Japan's surrender was made, a successful demonstration of the greatest explosive force in the history of the world had been accomplished.

After a long conference with the Cabinet, the military commanders and Prime Minister Churchill, it was decided to drop the atomic bomb on two Japanese cities devoted to war work for Japan. The two cities selected were Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

When Japan surrendered a few days after the bomb was indeed dropped, on August 6, 1945, the military estimated that at least a quarter of a million of the aviators losses against Japan and a quarter of a million Japanese had been spared complete destruction and that twice that many on each side would, otherwise, have been required to do the

As the executive who ordered the dropping of the bomb, I think the sacrifice of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was urgent and necessary for the prospective welfare of both Japan and the Allies.


The need for such a fateful decision of course never would have arisen, had we not been shot in the back by Japan at Pearl Harbor in December, 1941.

And in spite of that shot in the back, this country of ours, the United States of America, has been willing to work with the government of Japan as a good and peaceful nation.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Harry S. Truman

Honorable Takeo Nitogawa
Chairman
Hiroshima City Council
Hiroshima
Japan



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FROM THE DESK OF
HARRY S. TRUMAN

August 2, 1945

The world is faced with a situation that means either total destruction or the greatest age in history can be its lot.

The decision must be made and it must be made as soon as possible. The great nations and the great people of the earth have all been through trials and great difficulties down through the ages. They have fought each other for sovereignty and control along with the exploitation of their resources. All that has been accomplished is a return to old concepts and old ideas.

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Down through the ages there
have been men whose concept
of life was to live creditably and
to help others to live happily.
The Chinese, the East Indians,
the Hindus, the Jews and the
comparatively modern day
Christians have produced
ideas and moral codes for
the ideal of man living to-
gether in harmony.

Usually these great ideas have
been exploited by selfish rulers -
and unscrupulous priesthoods for
~~the~~ power and control at the

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expense of the very people
whose the great idealist wanted
to help

Now we are faced with total
destruction. The old Hebrew
Prophets presented the idea
of the destruction of the world
by fire after their prediction
of a destruction by water.

Well that destruction is at
last makes the great leaders
of the world present it.

Two thousand American men -
not here present an Appeal to
the Government and Peoples of

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the World to the President
of the United States.

Eleven thousand scientists,
from forty-nine nations have
presented to the Secretary General
of the United Nations by this
year of 1958 a story of their con-
cern over the un-
clear threat to humanity.

Those of the world who still
believe in morality and justice
are in the vast majority that
is true not only in the free
nations but it is true in
Russia, in China, in Spain
in Portugal, in the near East, in

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South America when the
dictators decide.

The leader of one of the
great nations whose voice
can be heard and listened
to should go to the Assembly
of the United Nations and ad-
vocate an international con-
trol of nuclear energy in the
interest of all mankind.
He should advocate an inter-
national police force for the
enforcement of control and
the maintenance of peace in
the Near East, the Far East,

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the Pacific, the Atlantic
and all around the world
No little dictator anywhere
should be permitted to op-
press his own people or to
use the methods of a bandit
to upset the peace of the
world and bring about its
complete destruction.

This rules to apply to the
~~big~~ ^{big} dictator and to
all nations free or slave
all around the world and
the ^{big} ~~big~~ destruction by fire

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will not come about.
It is up to our leaders



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